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The Development of Labor
Management Legislation
in Kentucky
By JoHn L. JONSON*
PART I
INTRODUCTION
Tim ROLE government should play in the regulation or control
of labor-management problems is subject to considerable disagree-
ment. 'Even among those who agree as to the extent of govern-
mental participation, agreement as to how the federal and state
governments should share the responsibility is far from unani-
mous. It is not the purpose of this study to explore critically the
history of governmental participation, nor the area of control
that should be assigned to the states; the purpose is to explore
some of the areas where state governments can, at the present
time, exercise authority. Particular emphasis will be placed on
the prevailing situation in Kentucky, and on suggested changes
in, or additions to, Kentucky legislation as it applies to labor-
management relations.
It is assumed initially that organized labor, and therefore the
collective bargaining process in labor-management relations, is a
permanent national institution. Trade associations, or societies of
workers engaged in the same trade or business, are among the
oldest and most enduring institutions known. In 1882 a well-
known economist wrote of trade unions in England: "Our grand-
fathers and great-grandfathers, not to speak of earlier ancestors,
did their best to crush all societies of workingmen, and ignomini-
* B.A., Michigan State University; Ph.D., University of Kentucky. Acting
Director, Bureau of Business Research, University of Kentucky.
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ous was their failure."' Since that time organized labor has be-
come much more firmly entrenched, in this country as well as in
England.
Because every period in history has been a period of change,
and because change frequently introduces or is associated with
new social and economic problems, the legal atmosphere of col-
lective bargaining should be geared to ever-changing conditions.
This may be accomplished in a variety of ways, conditioned pri-
marily by the outlook of each individual concerned.
Society has the right to expect every organization-labor, busi-
ness, or otherwise-to assume its proper responsibilities. In gen-
eral it may be said that an organization has accepted "responsi-
bility" if it behaves, not only as it is legally bound to do in respect
to the rights and property of others, but in a manner consistent
with the moral standards of the community in which it exists.
INDUSTRIIALIZATION
Many states, particularly during the past decade, have adopted
a variety of schemes designed to promote industrial expansion. The
objectives are increased job opportunities and increased total and
per capita income. These are admirable goals. It would be well
to ask then, "What effect, if any, do the statutes of a state as re-
gards labor-management relations have on industrialization?" One
authority makes this observation: "The larger companies which
have established plants in the South in recent years have not been
interested primarily in avoiding labor unions, as such, any more
than they have been primarily interested in low wages. Probably
most of these companies consider the unionization of their plants
inevitable anyway.... Thus, they are more likely to be interested
in assurances of evenhanded enforcement of law and order than
in anti-closed shop legislation by states."' In another instance,
executives of 122 companies which located plants in Texas in re-
cent years were asked why they chose Texas rather than some
other state. Each gave two most important reasons on "why they
located in Texas," and of the 244 answers "good labor relations
1 William Stanley Jevons, The State in Relation to Labor (London: MacMillan
Co., 1887), p. 109.
2 Calvin B. Hoover and B. U. Ratchford, Economic Resources and Policies of
the South, A Report of the National Planning Association (New York: MacMillan
Co., 1951), p. 382.
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and Texas labor laws" was mentioned 13 times and 'low salary
scale" was mentioned 3 times.3 This would suggest that a favor-
able labor-management relations climate is considerably more im-
portant than low wages as an inducement to industrialization. In
this particular sample of Texas firms, from the figures noted above,
it can be concluded that one of the two most important factors in
the industrialization picture in at least 10 per cent of the cases is
good labor relations and labor laws (or possibly the lack of legis-
lation), as viewed by the executives of firms seeking a plant loca-
tion.4
The people of Kentucky, as of many other states, have cause
to be concerned about the future increase in job opportunities.
There will be, in the state, more persons seeking work than there
are available jobs until such time as industrial growth is great
enough to absorb the natural increase in the labor force. The rules
and procedures governing collective bargaining relationships
should be one part of a general plan designed to promote the
growth of a democratic society.
THE EQUALrrY OF BARGAINING POWER
In 1898 the Supreme Court of the United States5 handed down
a decision that ushered in a new era relative to the relationships
between employers and employees. In this case (Holden v. Hardy)
the court held that ".... the law be forced to adapt itself to new
conditions of society, and particularly to the new relations be-
tween employers and employees, as they arise." "In this opinion
the court recognized, what had been dimly seen or implied from
the beginning of labor legislation, that inequality of bargaining
power is a justification under which the state may come to the
protection of the weaker party to the bargain."'
This reasoning-the responsibility of the state to protect the
weaker party-as it relates to employer-employee relationships is
now substantially entrenched as national policy. Section 1, of the
3 Florence Escott, Why 122 Manufacturers Located Plants in Texas, Texas
Industry Series, No. 3 (Austin: University of Texas Bureau of Business Research,
1954), P. 14.
4 The relationship between state labor-management legislation and indus-
trialization is discussed further in Chapter V.
5 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
6 John R. Commons and John B. Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1916), p. 29.
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Labor Management Relations Act of 19477 reads in part as fol-
lows:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty
of contract, and employers who are organized in the cor-
porate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to ag-
gravate recurrent business depressions by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry
and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries.
This section continues by stating that protecting the rights of
workers to organize, "restoring equality of bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees," safeguards and promotes the
full flow of commerce; but the law recognizes also that there are
"certain practices by some labor organizations, their officers, and
members" that obstruct the free flow of commerce, and that the
"elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the
assurance of the rights" guaranteed employees in the law. The
purpose of the act then, is not only to equalize bargaining power
but "to equalize legal responsibilities of labor organizations and
employers."
The development of public policy was not smooth prior to
1898, or even from 1842 when the Massachusetts Supreme Court
declared that either the goal of a labor organization or the
methods used to attain that goal must be illegal before the
organization can be judged a conspiracy.8 And, following the
Holden v. Hardy case, the development of public policy, as stated
in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, was sporadic
rather than gradual.
Public policy, then, is based partially on the bargaining dis-
advantage of labor. This policy says, in effect, that a greater social
good is to be derived by government interference in the relations
between employers and employees than could be derived by a
policy of noninterference. This interference on the federal level
amounts to defining rather comprehensively the rights and duties
of both parties and also the functions of government as they apply
to administrative and judicial procedures. It is rather obvious that
761 Stat. 136 (1947).8 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metcalf 11 (1842).
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complete economic freedom-an economy without controls-is
out of the question. Economic controls of one form or another go
back in history much farther than strong labor unions; it is an
issue of the type and degree of control that is pertinent.
THE Bi-ris OF INDivn)uALs AND TIM PROMOTION
OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE
One of the prime purposes of any legislation relating to labor-
management relations should be the promotion of industrial peace.
But industrial peace alone is not enough; the protection and the
enhancement of the fights and status of employees and employers
are vital. State policy, with considerable variation, as will be
shown in subsequent chapters, has usually followed one of three
major courses of development. The protective policy provides
against the interference by employers with the right of employees
to organize and bargain collectively. This policy is based, in
part, on the assumption that wages and other conditions of em-
ployment, in the absence of collective bargaining, are determined
solely by the employer; and that it is in the public interest to
recognize labor's inherent right to negotiate wage rates and other
conditions of employment on the basis of a bargaining equality.
The restrictive policy gives labor the right to organize as "a
matter of abstract justice rather than as a means of furthering the
public interest."9 Usually such laws incorporate most of the pro-
visions of the protective laws, but include also restrictions on the
rights of employees and unions in the practice of their "protected"
rights. It is difficult to classify in a general way these restrictions
because of the variations from state to state.
The third classification of state policy includes all states that
have no labor relations act. Many of these states have statutes
that amount merely to the codification of the common law relative
to the rights of employees and unions. Other states have restric-
tive laws of various types, such as the prohibition of government
employees to strike, special machinery for the settlement of dis-
putes in public utilities, anti-union security laws, controls over the
internal affairs of unions, boycott and picketing controls, and
many others, usually enacted as separate bits of legislation and
9 Charles C. Kiflingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 7-23.
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incorporating no specific policy as to the rights and duties of
employers and employees. It should be noted, however, that such
laws are generally restrictive by nature because in no instance is it
illegal for an employer to refuse to bargain with representatives of
his employees.
There is no specific statutory ideal that will insure industrial
peace that also insures the rights and status of employees and em-
ployers. Many states have gone far in experimenting with laws of
various types. These statutes, as will be noted in other chapters,
are frequently changed-sometimes by the courts, sometimes be-
cause of a change in federal law, and sometimes by state legisla-
tive action.
PART II
TBm JuEsDIcfroN OF STATES
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution during
the first century or so of this nation's existence created no really
serious obstacle to the fulfillment of national labor-management
policy. But the enormous economic changes of the past 75 years
have made necessary (or at least have resulted in) a constant
redefining of just what constitutes interstate commerce-interstate
commerce under control of the federal government relative to
employer-employee relationships.
The Labor Management Relations Act of 194710 in its declara-
tion of policy refers to "employees and employers in their relations
affecting" interstate commerce. The meaning of the word "affect-
ing" is subject to change; and, as a consequence, the coverage of
the law frequently is changed, or redefined, by the courts or by
the National Labor Relations Board. It would ordinarily be sup-
posed that the proper jurisdictional areas for states to exercise
authority are those where the federal government does not claim
jurisdiction. But even here, as will be noted later, the line of
demarcation is not always agreed upon nor clearly defined.
Within the LMRA are sections where jurisdiction is granted
to states or where the federal government and the states are both
10 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136; subsequently re-
ferred to as LMRA.
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presumed to have jurisdiction. The Act specifically allows states
to pass laws prohibiting compulsory union membership."
Other sections 12 of the LMRA provide for the participation
of states in connection with the conciliation and mediation pro-
visions, and Section 10(a) authorizes the National Labor Rela-
tions Board
by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to
cede to such agency jurisdiction over any [unfair labor prac-
tice] cases in any industry (other than mining, manufactur-
ing, communications, and transportation except where pre-
dominantly local in character) even though such cases may
involve labor disputes affecting commerce.
This section continues by saying the state or territorial act ap-
plicable must be consistent with the federal act and be so con-
strued. Except in those instances where states and territories
are specifically allowed to exercise authority, the courts have made
it clear that the federal government has pre-empted the field of
labor-management relations in interstate commerce. 3
There is deliberate exclusion of some employers in the federal
act, 4 and in the case of nonprofit hospitals one court has held that
"the state of Utah retained the power to protect the right of
hospital employees to self-organization, and could compel hospital
associations to bargain collectively with representatives selected
by them."'
But obviously, even in areas that are subject to control by the
federal government, a line must somewhere be drawn between
what does and does not "substantially" interfere with the flow of
commerce. The line is almost constantly being redefined or drawn
more clearly-the word "substantial" is constantly being given a
1 Ibid., sec. 14(b). "Nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing the
execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execu-
tion or application is prohibited by State or Territory law."
12 1bid., secs. 8( )(3), 202(e), and 203(b).
13 Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Em-
ployees of America, Div. 988, et al. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
840 U.S. 883 (1951). The police power of states is discussed below.
.4 LMRA, sec. 2(2).
15 Mozart G. Ratner, "Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Rela-
tions," New York University Fifth Annual Conference on Labor (New York:
Mathew Bender & Company, Incorporated, 1952), p. 91. The quotation is Mr.
Ratner's interpretation of Utah Board v. Utah Valley Hospital, 235 P. 2d 520, 28
LERM 2602 (1951).
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new or a more constricted definition. The Supreme Court has
frequently made it clear that there is no way to define accurately,
and in a manner to fit every circumstance, the phrase "substanti-
ally burdens and affects the flow of commerce." Chief Justice
Hughes speaking for the majority in one famous opinion said:
Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in
the light of our dual system of government and may not be
extended to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so
indirect and remote that to embrace them, in the view of
our complex society, would effectively obliterate the dis-
tinction between what is national and what is local and
create a completely centralized government. 6
Another Supreme Court opinion at a later date says substantially
the same thing. "Scholastic reasoning may prove that no activity
is isolated within the boundaries of a single State, but that cannot
justify absorption of legislative power by the United States over
every activity."'
7
In October, 1950, the National Labor Relations Board, for the
first time in its history,
announced specific standards to govern it in the exercise of
its jurisdiction .... The Board said: 'The time has come
when experience warrants the establishment and announce-
ment of certain standards which will better clarify and de-
fine where the difficult line can best be drawn.'
The Board has long been of the opinion that it would better
effectuate the purposes of the Act [LMRA] ... not to exer-
cise its jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible .... 's
This new policy of the NLRB was initiated by eight unanimous
decisions, each of which covered a particular one of the board's
new "yardsticks." In general, the policy of the board was to
"exercise jurisdiction over employers which annually ship goods
valued at $25,000 or more out of a State," 9 and to "decline juris-
diction where the direct inflow is less than $500,000 in value an-
16 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
17 Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 U.S. 643
(1944).
18 26 Labor Relations Reference Manual 50. Hereinafter referred to by the
letters LRRM.
19 Stanislaus Implement & Hardware Co., Ltd., 26 LRRM 1548.
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nually."20 In another case, even though the value of out-of-state
shipments was less than $25,000, the board found that it would
"effectuate the policies of the Act [LMRA] to assert jurisdiction
over enterprises which substantially affect the national defense."21
On July 15, 1954, the NLRB announced a revision of the
jurisdictional standards established in 1950 that substantially de-
creased the board's jurisdiction.22 A retail store, for example, to
meet the board's new standards, must have direct purchases out-
side the state of $1,000,000 annually or ship merchandise worth
$100,000 to other states. A radio station, to be subject to NLRB
jurisdiction, must have a gross income of $200,000, and a news-
paper, $500,000, while formerly no minimum standard existed.
The floor was similarly raised for utility companies, companies en-
gaged in business relating to national defense, multistate busi-
nesses other than trade and service, and companies which supply
services to interstate companies; and in no instance will the board
exercise jurisdiction over restaurants.
23
The NLRB has subsequently broadened its jurisdiction over
multistate nonretail enterprises. In December, 1955, the NLRB
stated that it would take jurisdiction over any unit of a multistate
nonretail enterprise where the gross volume of business of the
entire enterprise is at least $3,500,000 annually, or of any unit of
a multistate retail enterprise if the annual gross volume of business
of the entire enterprise amounts to at least $10,000,000.24 The
NLRB, in January, 1956, said it would consider any case where a
nonretail firm makes sales amounting to a minimum of $100,000
annually to other firms which meet the Board's jurisdictional
standards.25
Unlike the NLRB announcement of jurisdictional standards in
October, 1950, the 1954 changes were not endorsed unanimously
by the board. In the Breeding Transfer Co. case,26 where the
reasons for the 1954 standards are set forth, the majority opinion
20 Federal Dairy, Inc., 26 LRRM 1538.
21 Westport Moving & Storage Co., 26 LRRM 1581.
22 34 LRRM 75.
23 NLRB public release No. R-449, July 15, 1954.
24 Coca Cola Bottling Co. of New York, Inc., 114 NLRB No. 225 (Dec. 20,
1955).25 Wijpany Motor Co., Inc., 115 NLRB No. 11 (Jan. 12, 1956).
26 Breeding Transfer Co. v. General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers,
Local 21, affated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 110
NLBB No. 64 (Oct. 26, 1954).
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stated that "a desire to establish broader State jurisdiction is in no
wise a factor in our decision." The purpose in establishing the
new standards was "to apply a reasonable rule measured by the
probable impact of a labor dispute on interstate commerce." The
majority members estimated the board's case load would be re-
duced by 10 per cent but the number of employees covered by the
LMRA would be reduced by no more than I per cent. The
minority opinion in the same case said the new standards "are
premised upon the view that there should be a reallocation of
authority between the federal government and the states in the
regulation of labor relations.... Such action inescapably entails
a usurpation of legislative power by an administrative agency."
One exception to the jurisdictional standards of the NLRB
has to do with small firms that bargain as an association. If the
combined business of the association is great enough to fall within
the board's jurisdiction, the board will consider the association as
a single employer.
27
It has been argued by some that the area where the NLRB
clearly can but does not choose to exercise jurisdiction is a sort of
"no-man's land." The Supreme Court has decided that, when the
policies of the LMRA would not be effectuated, it is quite proper
for the NLRB to decline to act even though it clearly has juris-
diction to do so.28 And in a later case2 9 the Supreme Court stated
specifically that a state could not take jurisdiction where the
federal act applied. One NLRB General Counsel answered the
question thus: "In practice the Board never has, and I think I
may confidently predict it never will, interfere to block state
action in a situation where the Board chooses to stay its hand be-
cause it believes the impact of the activity on commerce to be
insubstantial."30 The New York courts, however, have said that
even though the NLRB has declined to exercise its jurisdiction
27 Insulation Contractors of Southern Calif., Inc. and Plant Insulation Co.;
International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, AFL,
and its Agent, Albert E. Hutchinson, 110 NLRB No. 105 (Oct. 29, 1954).
28 NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675
(1951).2 9 Garner et al., trading as Central Storage and Transfer Company v. Team-
sters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (AFL), et al., 345 U.S. 991
(1953).30 0 eorge J. Bott, speaking before the Arkansas Bar Association, May 31, 1954,
quoted in 34 LRRM 80.
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for "budgetary or other reasons," the New York Labor Relations
Board cannot assume jurisdiction."
In the Garner case, the U. S. Supreme Court decided that a
state could not enjoin acts which are unfair labor practices under
the LMRA. But a few months later, June 7, 1954, the same court
upheld a claim for damages granted by the courts of Virginia and
arising from an unfair labor practice under the LMRA."2 The lat-
ter was a tort action at common law, and it is the opinion of the
Supreme Court that the "LMRA had not pre-empted jurisdiction
so as to exclude state courts from entertaining the court action
for damages."33 In the Garner case, said the court, the NLRB
had an administrative remedy; in the Laburnum case, the right of
recovery for damages in the state court did not conflict with any
remedy available under the federal law.
The Supreme Court held to the Garner decision some time
later.34  The Missouri courts had issued an injunction on the
grounds that picketing had violated not only the LMRA but also
the state "restraint of trade" law. The NLRB had previously
determined that no unfair labor practice existed, and it mattered
not at all to the Supreme Court that the Missouri courts had
found grounds for issuance under another statute. But before the
federal courts can act, the NLRB must have passed on the case
where an unfair labor practice under the LMRA is the issue."
The power of a state to control or regulate labor relations
procedures is based on police power; the power of the federal gov-
ernment is based on the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Therefore,
since the National Act pre-empts only the field of labor re-
lations law and policy, the states are not precluded from
applying to unions, employees or employers the same gen-
eral legal policy standards which are applicable to citizens
generally. Violence by unions or employers, and unlawful
seizures of property, for example, are not placed beyond the
31 New York State Labor Relations Board v. Wags Transportation System, Inc.
(1954), 34 LRRM 2855. Affirmed by Appellate Division, 85 LRRM 2058.
32 United Construction Workers affiliated with United Mine Workers of
America, et al. v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 847 U.S. 656 (1954).
33 40 American Bar Association Journal, 702 (1954).
34 Weber, et al. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 75 S. Ct. 480 (1955).
35 Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, et al. v. The Richman Brothers,
75 S. Ct. 452 (1955).
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power of states to control merely because they occur in a
labor relations context.3 6
Jurisdiction is an important issue. But perhaps more important
in any discussion of state control is the business sphere where
jurisdictional problems do not apply. "Only rarely, if ever, does
the board [NLRB] handle cases involving hotels, restaurants,
laundries, dry-cleaning establishments, beauty parlors, garages
and other service industries, hospitals, cemeteries, retail stores,
local transportation, local utilities and building and construction
contractors."3 7 In addition, but subject to a change in jurisdic-
tional standards by the NLRB, there are many employers and
employees in every industry that are not covered by federal legis-
lation. It is impossible from the available statistics to determine
accurately the number of employees in the nation or in any state
that are outside federal jurisdiction. Table I shows, for Kentucky,
the number of employees and employers in the industries that
are predominantly subject to'state jurisdiction.
TABLE 1
NUummE oF Fums AND EMnLoYEms
IN SELECrED INDUSTMES IN KENTUCKY, 1953
Industry Employeesa Employersb
All industries ............................................ 475,206 39,024
Industries predominantly subject to
state jurisdiction:
Construction ................................ 44,910 3,205
Public Utilities ............. 11,770 587
Retail Trade .................................. 97,604 15,066
Services .......................................... 40,605 8,133
Totals .................................... 194,889 26,991
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, County Business Patterns, 1953, Part
7 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 34-86.
a Employees covered by the Old Age and Survivors Insurance program.
b Actually this is "reporting units," and probably is a slight understatement of
the number of employers.
c Selected privately operated public utilities predominantly local in character.
36 Ratner, op. cit., p. 117. See also Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
37 Charles C. Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 8. The contraction of the area of jurisdiction
assumed by the NLRB since 1948 is discussed above.
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Within the four industries listed in Table 1, there are probably
many employers and employees subject to federal jurisdiction;
but, likewise, in the industries not listed (manufacturing, mining,
several public utilities, wholesale trade, and finance), there are
probably many employers and employees who do not come under
the jurisdiction of the NLRB. An approximation of the coverage
of the federal law as it applies to commerce and business in Ken-
tucky shows that about 69 per cent of all employers and 41 per
cent of all employees in the state fall outside the federal juris-
dictional orbit.
PART III
TBE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY IN KENTUCKY
Kentucky is not among those states that have comprehensive
labor relations acts to deal with labor-management problems in
intrastate commerce. The Kentucky Department of Industrial Re-
lations is relatively new, even though the state has had some
"labor legislation" since 1902. In that year the General Assembly
created the office of labor inspector in the Bureau of Agriculture,
Labor and Statistics.38 The inspector and his assistant were to be
men having a practical knowledge of factories and shops. But it
was stated in the act that neither the inspector nor his assistant
were to take part, interfere, or in any way become involved in any
strike or similar labor difficulty. 9
The 1902 act was amended ten years later 0 and provided for
the appointment of two labor inspectors and two assistants, a man
and a woman in each capacity. The duties of these persons were
not changed substantially and, as in the 1902 act, consisted pri-
marily of inspecting factories and other places of employment for
any violation of the laws relating to the employment of women
and children. 1 It was also the duty of the labor inspectors to
collect statistics concerning labor when directed to do so by the
Commissioner of Agriculture. Under the 1912 statute, however,
38 Kentucky Acts 1902, chap. 24.
39 Ibid., see. 7.4
0 Kentucky Acts 1912, chap. 108.
41 Ibid., see. 2.
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the inspectors were still prohibited from interfering in any labor
difficulty.
4 2
The 1902 act and the 1912 amendments were repealed in
1924;13 but the 1924 act made no material changes in the func-
tions of the labor inspectors as prescribed in the earlier legisla-
tion. The Department of Labor, still in the Bureau of Agricul-
ture, Labor and Statistics, was, as before, without a voice in labor
disputes or lockouts."
Tim DEPARTmENT OF INDusTRIAL RELATIONS
In 1936, just as the nation was emerging from the Great De-
pression and a new national policy relating to the place of organ-
ized labor in the economy was fast developing, the General As-
sembly passed a rather inclusive reorganization act.45 Article XV
of this act established, as a major department of the state ad-
ministrative system, the Department of Industrial Relations. This
department, except as otherwise provided, exercised all the ad-
ministrative functions of the state having to do with employer-
employee relationships. Its functions in 1936, among others, were
those relating to employer-employee relationships and the safety
of workers. The Chief Labor Inspector and the deputy inspectors
became a part of the new department in January, 1940. The de-
partment was charged with the promotion of friendly relation-
ships between employers and employees, and directed to concern
itself with the improvement of living conditions of employees.
46
This act, however vague and nonspecific, was the first major legis-
lative departure from the pattern that was first set in 1902. Also,
it was the forerunner of a more comprehensive law47 that was
enacted four years later.
The functions and duties of the department and of the Com-
missioner of Industrial Relations, related to the subject matter of
this study as prescribed by the 1940 legislation and still a part of
the law of the Commonwealth, were expanded to include the
42 Ibid., sec. 5.
43 Kentucky Acts 1924, chap. 68.
44 Ibid., sec. 13.
45 Kentucky Acts 1936 (Extra Session), chap. 1.
46 Ibid., sec. 1.
47Kentucky Acts 1940, chap. 105; Kentucky Revised Statutes (hereafter
cited as KRS), 336.
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promotion and development of fair practices by employers and
employees; and the department was further charged to discourage
and eliminate as far as practicable all unfair practices of either
party.48 Included in the duties and obligations, as set forth in the
statute, are the specific functions of the department. But the legis-
lature chose not to be specific as to how friendly relationships
between employers and employees should be promoted. Unfair
labor practices are not specifically defined but, perhaps more im-
portant, there is no machinery for administration and enforce-
ment. It has been stated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals that
implications are never to be extended beyond a fair and reason-
able inference. 49 A maxim this court has consistently followed is
that the enumeration of particular things excludes the idea of
something else not mentioned.50 And in the act there is an
"enumeration of particular things." For example, employers may
not interfere when employees choose to associate collectively, or
collectively designate representatives to negotiate terms and con-
ditions of employment.5 The act continues by saying that neither
party "shall engage or be permitted to engage in unfair or illegal
acts or practices or resort to violence, intimidation, threats or
coercion." The Kentucky act, in this respect, is quite similar to
the federal act5 2 and to many state laws." But unlike the federal
statute and the state acts that are patterned after, or similar to,
the federal act, the unfair practices of the parties are not spelled
out. The Kentucky act does not say, for example, that it is an
unfair practice for either party to refuse to bargain collectively.
Although it is the policy of the state to eliminate unfair labor
48 KRS 336.040.
49 Bloemer v. Turner, 281 Ky. 832, 137 S.W. 2d 387 (1939).
50 Ibid.
51 KRS 336.130.
52 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, sec. 7.
53 Colorado Statutes Annotated, chap. 97, see. 94.
General Statutes of Connecticut, chap. 370, sees. 7388-7399.
Kansas General Statutes, chap. 44, secs. 801-815.
Acts of Massachusetts, 1937, chap. 436.
Compiled Laws of Michigan, chap. 423.
Minnesota Statutes, chap. 179.
New York Consolidated Laws, chap. 31, art. 20.
Oregon Revised Statutes, chap. 661.
Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, Title 43, chap. 7, sec. 211.
Public Laws of Rhode Island, 1941-42, chap. 1066.
Utah Code Annotated, Title 34, chap. 1.
Wisconsin Statutes, chap. 111, subchap. 1.
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practices whenever possible, the Department of Industrial Re-
lations is without power to carry out this policy because such
practices are not specifically defined.
ELECTIONS
Kentucky law does not provide for the holding of representa-
tion elections except by consent of both the employer and his em-
ployees. Even if it were possible for either party to force a
representation election, 54 it would not be an unfair practice, fol-
lowing the election, for either party to refuse to bargain col-
lectively. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held that such elec-
tions may be held only if both parties give consent.55 The Blue
Boar Cafeteria Co. case reached the courts as a result of an at-
tempt by the Commissioner of Industrial Relations, at the request
of a union, 6 to conduct a representation election. In a letter to
the employer, the commissioner stated that the election would be
held on the premises of the employer during working hours if he
did not "agree to a consent election." The court again held that
the "powers of officers are limited to those conferred expressly by
a statute or which exist by a necessary and clear implication."
Even though the employees have a statutory right to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, there is
nothing in Kentucky law that says or expressly implies that the
employer must recognize a labor organization or even consent to
an election to determine if the organization represents the majority
of the employees. Only two states" that have comprehensive
labor relations laws make no provision for such elections.
STRIKEs, PICKETING, AND BoycoTTs
Under Kentucky law, employees are allowed to strike, engage
in peaceful picketing, and assemble collectively for peaceful pur-
poses."" As in the case of most rights, the right to strike, to picket
peacefully, or to assemble collectively for peaceful purposes, is not
unlimited. Just as the right to drive an automobile rests upon the
54 Sometimes referred to as a "collective bargaining election."
55 Blue Boar Cafeteria Co., Inc. v. Hackett et al., 312 Ky. 288, 227 S.W.
(2d) 199 (1950).
O Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union,
Local No. 181.
57 Kansas and Michigan. 58 KRS 336.130.
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observance of traffic rules, there are rules that regulate strikes and
picketing. These and other activities concerning employer-em-
ployee relations must be conducted without recourse by either
party to illegal acts, violence, intimidation, threats, or coercion.5
The right to strike, although written into Kentucky statutory
law for the first time in 1940, was, in effect, considered as such by
the courts many years previous. On February 7, 1912, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, in a rather lengthy decision,60 confirmed
this right. Just as the employer was free to discharge any or all
of his employees without cause, said the court, the employees, in
the absence of a contract, could likewise withdraw their labor. A
man's labor is his own; an organization of workers may legally act
as one.
Twenty years after the Saulsberry case, the Court of Appeals
handed down two more decisions"' in which a strike is again
termed a lawful act. In these two cases the court was not in-
terested in determining the legality of the strikes; this was an
accepted fact. Both cases were on appeal from a conviction
under Kentucky's "banding and confederating" law, 2 frequently
referred to as the "conspiracy" law. The strike is without doubt
the most potent of all the pressures employees can use in a dispute
with an employer. Any legislation by the state, or any decision
by the courts, that has the effect of increasing or decreasing the
pressure that can be brought to bear on either the employer or the
nonstriking employees, therefore, is important, in determining the
effectiveness of strikes. Kentucky's conspiracy law was passed in
1878 and intended as a control of the activities of the Ku Klux
Klan. It has seldom been used effectively as a control of strike
activity.0 3 The courts have repeatedly stated in conspiracy cases
59 Ibid.60 Saulsberry v. Coopers International Union, Thomas McManus and Ed. Line-
back, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).61 Alsbrook v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 814, 50 S.W. (2d) 22 (1932); Newton
v. Commonwealth, 244 Ky. 41, 50 S.W. 2d 18 (1932).
62 KRS 487.110. This is the so-called Ku Klux law and was enacted in 1873;
and, as amended, reads in part as follows: "No two persons shall confederate or
band themselves together and go forth for the purpose of intimidating, alarming,
disturbing or injuring any person... [or] for the purpose of molesting, damaging
or destroying any property of another person, whether the property is molested,
damaged or destroyed or not." (Violation of this law was reduced from a felony
to a misdemeanor in 1948.)
63 George N. Stevens, "The Development of Labor Law in Kentucky," 28
Kentucky Law Journal, 173 (1940); Underhill v. Murphy, 117 Ky. 640, 78
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that the line between criminal coercion and legal persuasion is
faint indeed. 4 This is particularly true in labor dispute cases
where the employer's rights and the right to strike must both be
protected. In Alsbrook v. Commonwealth, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals said:
The right to live in peace and quiet, and pursue according
to his own inclinations such lawful employment as he
pleases, is one of the highest privileges of the citizen....
Every citizen of the commonwealth is entitled to be pro-
tected in the peaceable enjoyment of any legitimate business
or occupation he is following.... On the other hand, men
engaged in a lawful strike as was the appellant and his as-
sociates have a lawful right to assemble and to address their
fellow men and endeavor in a peaceful, reasonable, and
proper manner to persuade them regarding the merits of
their cause, and to enlist sympathy, support, and succor in
the struggle for the betterment of working conditions, or for
higher wages, or for the advancement of their interests.
As noted above, peaceful picketing is permissible under Ken-
tucky law, but only so long as it is free from violence, intimida-
tion, threats, or coercion. Picketing is the usual and most im-
portant method of soliciting support for a strike. Strikes, picket-
ing, and other concerted activities of organized labor, under com-
mon law, were prima facie a tort, and permissible only if legally
justified. In 1937, following considerable preliminary develop-
ment, the United States Supreme Court gave the first indication
that peaceful picketing may be identified with freedom of
speech. 5 As such, it is protected by the United States Constitu-
tion. Two later cases"( further clarified the Supreme Court's posi-
tion. This doctrine-that picketing is a form of free speech and
therefore protected by the Constitution (limited considerably by
later cases) -substantially limited the area of state jurisdiction
S.W. 482 (1904); and Cobb v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 424, 46 S.W. 2d 776
(1932).
64 Commonwealth v. Morton et al., 140 Ky. 628, 131 S.W. 506 (1910); KAs-
brook v. Commonwealth, 243 Ky. 814, 50 S.W. 2d 22 (1932); and Chapman v.
Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 631, 172 S.W. 2d 228 (1943).
05 Senn v. Tile Layer's Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937). For further discussion
of this point see Charles C. Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 53.66Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), in which a state law prohibiting
picketing was declared unconstitutional; and Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106
(1940), in which the same action was taken relative to a county ordinance.
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over the control of picketing, and the development of public policy
in Kentucky must be considered in this light.
Workers had the right to picket peacefully 7 and the right to
assemble peaceably for the purpose of persuading other men not
to take their jobs68 by the early 1930's. It was stated also, as early
as 1920, that organized workers were free to use peaceful means,
not otherwise illegal, to induce other workers to join the organiza-
tion.69 The latter case, Diamond Block Coal Co. v. U.M.W.A.,
was important, not only as a statement of the rights of organized
labor, but because it dissolved an all-embracing injunction ob-
tained by the coal company against the union. Injunctions
restraining the activities of organized labor had been issued in
this country prior to the Debs case,70 but 1894 is generally con-
sidered the date of birth of this type control in labor disputes.
The first case to be heard by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in-
volving an injunction growing out of a labor dispute was one in
which a union was the party seeking relief.1 In this case the
union sought to prevent an employer from using a certain cigar
label, claimed to be the property of the union. The case was
decided in favor of the union.
The first case decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in-
volving an injunction obtained by an employer restricting the
activities of a labor organization was in 1904.72 The court in this
instance upheld the position of the employer. The injunction was
brought against former employees, all members of a union, to
enjoin acts of violence and intimidation. In this first case involv-
ing such an injunction obtained by an employer, the court was
careful to spell out the legitimate rights of organized labor. But
the court further stated that "where the breach of a criminal law
is also a violation of a property right the chancellor may interpose
by injunction to protect property." Organized labor was the victor
in the next case7" to reach the state's highest court. The expression
67 Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture Machine Operator's Local No. 165,
249 Ky. 639, 61 S.W. 2d 283 (1938).68 Newton v. Commonwealth, 244 Ky. 41, 10 S.W. 2d 18 (1932).
69 Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America et al., 188
Ky. 477, 222 S.W. 1079 (1920).
7o Pullman Co. v. Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
71 Hetterman v. Powers, 102 Ky. 133, 43 S.W. 180 (1897).
7
2 Underhill v. Murphy, 117 Ky. 640, 78 S.W. 482 (1904).
73 Saulsberry v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018
(1912).
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of the court in this instance was that a labor organization could
not be required to enter into a contract with an employer on terms
not acceptable to the union; nor could a union be deprived of the
right of control over its property. The Diamond Block Coal Co.
case mentioned above was the next of this nature to reach the
Court of Appeals, and again the decision was in favor of the union.
This phrase-"in favor of the union"-however, may be misleading.
It brings to light what was then, and in some cases still is, the
misuse of the injunctive process.74 The temporary restraining
order was granted in the lower court, in the Diamond Block Coal
Co. case, on March 10, 1920, and dissolved by the Court of Ap-
peals on June 18, 1920, an elapsed time of more than three months.
During this period the injunction remained in effect; and, without
interference from the union, the employer was free to bolster his
position. The company may have known the order would be dis-
solved by the high court, but during the interim it may win its
battle with the union so dissolution of the order could mean little
to the union as a victory. In a rather lengthy decision the court
took the opportunity to point up, in terms that could not possibly
be misunderstood, that 'labor unions have a status in this country
the same as other associations.... The general rule seems to be
that organizers of labor unions may use any peaceable means, not
partaking of fraud to induce persons to become members, and
equity will not enjoin such organizers ......
In 1933 the Court of Appeals again held that peaceful picket-
ing could not be enjoined even though inspired by neither a strike
nor a drive to organize the unorganized, but "the making of false
statements, the indulgence of violence, and interference with the
business" 75 constituted grounds for injunctive relief. Following
the Senn case (1937), and prior to the next two cases77 wherein
the doctrine of "picketing as a form of free speech" was expounded
by the United States Supreme Court, the Kentucky Court of Ap-
74 The authorities that may be quoted here are numerous, but see particularly,
in reference to Kentucky, Stevens, op. cit., 182; and James D. Cornette, "Tempo-
rary Restraining Orders,' 40 Kentucky Law Journal, 98-104 (1951).
75 Music Hall Theatre v. Moving Picture Machine Operator's Local No. 165,
246 Ky. 639, 61 S.W. 2d 283 (1933). The quotation, although applicable in
the Music Hall case, is from Hotel, Restaurant and Soda Fountain Employees
Local Union No. 181 v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 114 S.W. 2d 501 (1938).
76 Senn v. Tile Layer's Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).77 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); and Carlson v. California, 310
U.S. 106 (1940).
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peals made it clear that picketing could be enjoined in the ab-
sence of a bona fide labor dispute. 8 Such was the situation in
Kentucky when the free speech doctrine was at its pinnacle
nationally.
Based on the Thornhill and Carlson decisions, and in particular
on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in American
Federation of Labor v. Swing 9 that legalized picketing in a second-
ary boycott case, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1941 changed
its position on what constituted legal picketing.80 The court stated
in the Blanford case that "members of any union, so long as they
refrain from acts of violence, cannot be enjoined from picketing
premises of any persons against whom the union has a grievance,
or from conducting a boycott against his business." Contrary to
the previously prevailing doctrine, the Blanford case made it clear
that pickets need not be employees of the establishment being
picketed.
But what appeared to be complete association of picketing
with the constitutional provision guaranteeing to persons the right
of free speech was soon to be qualified. In a series of cases8' that
came before the United States Supreme Court in the years im-
mediately following the Swing case, it became clear "that some
rules regarding time, place, manner, and circumstance may be
applied to picketing which are not applied to other methods of
communicating ideas."82 Picketing by an organized group was
determined to be something more than free speech. That "some-
thing more" gave back to the states some of the control over
picketing. And again in 1949 the Supreme Court held that "picket-
ing is not beyond the control of a State if the manner in which the
picketing is conducted or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate
78 Hotel, Restaurant and Soda Fountain Employees Local Union No. 181 v.
Miller, 272 Ky. 466, 141 S.W. 2d 501 (1938). Twelve states besides Kentucky
had taken this position by 1941; six states had taken the position that picketing
could be legal in nonstrike situations. Ira Schlusselberg, "The Free Speech Safe-
guard for Labor Picketing," 34 Kentucky Law Journal, 10 (1945).
79 312 U.S. 321 (1941).
80 Blanford et al. v. Press Publishing Co., 286 Ky. 662, 151 S.W. 2d 440
(1941).
81 Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers v. WohI, 315 U.S. 769 (1942);
Carpenters and Joiners Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Bitter's Cafe, 315 U.S.
722 (1942); and Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312
U.S. 287 (1941).
82 Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 56.
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gives grounds for its disallowance."83 The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals has interpreted this to mean that the state may enjoin picket-
ing that contravenes the law or public policy of the state.84 In
the Blue Boar case of 1952, the Court of Appeals held that picket-
ing by nonemployees involved coercion in violation of Kentucky
law. 5 Pressure, through picketing, said the court, was put on the
employer to coerce his employees into joining the union.
One year previous to the 1952 Blue Boar decision, the Court
of appeals upheld the right of a union to continue picketing an
establishment where a strike was in process even though, accord-
ing to the argument of the employer, all strikers had been re-
placed, and the strike and the picketing had wholly failed in their
purpose.8 The court, in this case, refused to "go on record as
upholding this method of 'breaking' a strike." Less than five
months later, however, the court upheld a lower court decision
enjoining all picketing because "evidence was sufficient to show
that unions were in contempt of court for violating injunction
[enjoining all except peaceful picketing by a limited number of
pickets] ... in connection with picketing of hotels and building."
7
The emp!oyees of two hotels and another building had gone on
strike at the same time and the court held that, because all three
buildings had common ownership, it amounted to a single strike.
In the 1952 Blue Boar case, picketing by nonemployees was
held to be enjoinable. It was not determined how many of a
company's employees would have to be in the picket line to
change the situation from one of "forcing the employer to exercise
coercion on the employees to join the union" to "a legal strike to
persuade the employer to recognize the union as bargaining agent
for the employees." In a later case,88 where one employee was
"persuaded to go on strike," the Court of Appeals upheld an in-
junction granted to restrain all picketing on the basis of the Blue
83 Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1949).
84 Blue Boar Cafeteria Co., Inc. v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bar-
tenders International Union Local No. 181, 254 S.W. 2d 335 (Ky., 1952).
85 KRS 336.130.
813 Broadway and Fourth Ave. Realty Co. v. Local No. 181, Hotel and Restau-
rant Employees Union et al., 244 S.W. 2d 746 (Ky., 1951).
87 Local No. 181, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union et al. v. Broadway
and Fourth Avenue Realty Co. and Local No. 181, Hotel and Restaurant Em-
ployees Union et al. v. Brown Hotel Co., 248 S.W. 2d 713 (Ky., 1952).
~8 Local No. 227, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workers of North
America, et al. v. F. B. Purnell Sausage Co., 264 S.W. 2d 870 (Ky., 1953).
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Boar decision. The court did hold, however, that the injunction
could not be extended to restrain the union from requesting the
customers of the employer to cease doing business with him so
long as the shop remained nonunion. The issue of whether or not
the union's requests of the employer's customers constituted a
secondary boycott was not raised. But in another case89 decided
by the Court of Appeals a few months earlier, and involving a
quite different set of circumstances, the court said:
An important factor in determining whether activities of
union against an employer other than the one with which
union has labor dispute come within purview of secondary
boycott is the relationship between the two employers, and
if the relationship is so close that one may be regarded as
the ally of the other, picketing of one may be permissible
during labor dispute with other.
CONCILTATION, MEDIATION, AND ABBITBlATION
Kentucky law specifies that the Commissioner of Industrial
Relations may act as mediator and conciliator in labor disputes,
and may "appoint conciliators and mediators in labor disputes
whenever his intervention is requested by either party."0 The
commissioner may also offer his services in any emergency result-
ing from a labor dispute. If the parties accept his offer, he is
authorized to hold hearings and receive the testimony of witnesses
under oath. If the parties accept the commissioner's offer, they
also accept the responsibility of refraining from engaging in either
a strike or a lockout for a period not to exceed 15 days.
In practice, the commissioner intervenes in labor disputes only
at the request of both parties. Obviously, very little can be accom-
plished by conciliation and mediation if one or both parties to a
dispute choose not to cooperate. It does appear, however, that
such services have declined in importance as a function of the
Department of Industrial Relations. The services of the depart-
ment were requested in only six instances during the fiscal year
ended June 80, 1954; while, in the years immediately following
the enactment of the law, as many as 144 major cases and "scores"
89 General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 89 v.
American Tobacco Co., 264 S.W. 2d 250 (Ky., 1953).90 KRS 417.
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of lesser cases were handled in a single year." It is common, in
the department's annual reports, to encourage both labor and in-
dustry to utilize the conciliation and mediation services offered.
The arbitration of labor disputes in Kentucky is subject to the
rules and procedures set forth in the law covering all arbitration
proceedings.92 Prior to 1949, only one case93 could be found "in
which an interpretation of Kentucky decisions is applied to an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement."9 In this
case a coal company employee sought back wages claimed to be
due under the wage clause of a collective bargaining agreement.
It was the employer's contention that compliance with the arbitra-
tion procedure of the agreement must precede the bringing of
action. The court, however, ruled that in Kentucky any agree-
ment to arbitrate all disputes arising under a contract is invalid
and unenforcible because it is an attempt to take over the jurisdic-
tion of the courts. It was further held that the National Arbitra-
tion Acte5 did not apply "to agreements concerning employees in
interstate commerce."
In a Kentucky Law Journal article96 dealing with the subject
of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements, the
author suggested that full account of Kentucky policy was not
taken in the Cox case. Such does not appear to be the situation in
a 1952 Kentucky Court of Appeals decision.97 "The law," said the
court, "favors and encourages the settlement of controversies by
arbitration." Arbitrators are to have due regard for "natural
justice," and are neither required nor expected to "follow the strict
rules of law." The substitution of arbitration for a court of law
should not be agreed to by the parties if they want "exact justice."
91 Kentucky Department of Industrial Relations, Annual Reports.
02 KRS 417.
93 Catliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F. 2d 876 (C.A. 6th, 1944).94 Catherine E. Gillis, "Enforcibility of Arbitration Clauses in Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements," 37 Kentucky Law Journal 198 (1949).
9543 Stat. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C. sec. 3 (1940).
D0 Gills, op. cit., 198-203.97Smith v. Hillerich and Bradshy Co., Inc., 253 S.W. 2d 629 (Ky., 1952).
The court quoted KRS 417.040, as applicable in this decision: "There must be a
gross mistake of law or fact constituting evidence of misconduct amounting to
fraud or undue partiality in order to impeach an [arbitration] award.."
98 KRS 336.170.
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"ONE HuNDsm oR Mos MEImmn s"
In 1952 the Kentucky legislature passed a law9 providing that
"every national or international labor organization having one
hundred or more members in good standing who reside or work in
Kentucky" shall, at all times, have one or more chartered locals
or subsidiary organizations in the state. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals, in upholding this law,9 noted that it is quite proper to
consider the historical setting and economic conditions that in-
spired the General Assembly to enact such a law. In this instance,
the need for such a law, as the court interpreted the action of the
legis!ature, was based on conditions growing out of the construc-
tion of the atomic energy plant in western Kentucky.
Ju-Ic &L ENFRC ERcET oF CoLLEcTivE BA-RGAnING AGRE MENTs
Various judicial techniques may be employed in the enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements. In Kentucky the courts
have held to the theory of agency.100 In other words, in negotiat-
ing the terms and conditions of employment with the employers,
a union acts as the agent of its members. As such, the union is not
a party to the agreement; and to enforce the provisions of the
agreement, claims must be pressed by individual employees who
must also be members of the agent union.1 1
Under the strict interpretation of common law, a labor union,
because it is a voluntary association, could neither sue nor be
sued. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held to this interpretation
until 1948, although it had had, many times previously, the op-
portunity to take a stand on the legal status of labor organizations
that would clarify the situation. Even now there appears to be no
99 Hamilton v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 262 S.W. 2d 695
(Ky., 1953).
100 Louisville Railway Co. v. Louisville Area Transport Workers Union et al.
and Transport Workers Union of America, C.I.O., et al. v. Louisville Area Trans-
port Workers Union, 312 Ky. 626. 228 S.W. 2d 652 (1950); and Hill v. United
Public Workers of America, 314 Ky. 791, 236 S.W. 2d 887 (1950). In both of
these cases, the membership decided to join and support, as the bargaining repre-
sentative, a union different from the one currently in control. The court held such
action proper because the members are principals to a bargaining agreement (con-
tract); the union plays only the role of agent. The members, said the court, were
free to select a new agent if they so chose.
101 For a brief discussion of the agency theory and others that are employed
as judicial tools see Charles 0. Gregory, Labor and the Law (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1946), pp. 379-390.
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cut-and-dried rule relative to suits involving labor organizations.
In the 1948 case,102 in which a discharged employee sought money
damages for "actual loss of time, and for future loss of time,
humiliation, embarrassment and willful actions of defendants...,"
the court held in favor of the discharged employee and against
the unions. The case was decided under the "Civil Code of Prac-
tice,10 3 the Constitution" and statutes'0 5 quoted, fortified by the
reasoning in the Asher-Express case0 . and Coronado case."1
07
Kentucky labor legislation is little more than the codification
of previously existing common law or judicial interpretations of
prevailing national and state policy. Employees had already
been granted the right to strike, to picket peacefully, and to as-
semble collectively for peaceful purposes, prior to the legislative
sanctioning of these rights. The rules of conduct that must be
followed in the exercise of these rights were also pretty well
spelled out.
Although the Department of Industrial Relations is charged
with eliminating, as far as possible, all unfair labor practices, the
activities that constitute such practices are not stipulated in the
law. Therefore, neither party to a dispute can be forced to bargain
collectively; nor can the Department of Industrial Relations de-
termine via the election process, the labor organization, if any,
that represents the majority of the employees unless both parties
102 Jackson v. International Union of Operating Engineers et al., 807 Ky. 485,
211 S.W. 2d 138 (1948).
103 Watson Clay, Kentucky Civil Rules: Practice and Procedure (St. Paul:
West Publishing Co., 1954), Rule 28.01. This rule, under certain conditions, al-
lows persons constituting a "class" to sue or be sued. "A 'true' class action is one
in which there is a community of right or interest in the claim or defense ...
Examples would be members of unincorporated associations such as labor unions.
104 Sec. 208. "The word corporation as used in this Constitution shall em-
brace joint-stock companies and associations."
105 KRS 446.010. "'Corporation' may extend and be applied to any corpora-
tion... or association."
10 o American Railway Express Co. v. Asher, 218 Ky. 172, 291 S.W. 21 (1927).
The court, in this case, upheld "the principle that our statutes justify or authorize
a suit against an unincorporated association."
107 United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 844
(1922). This case provided a base for class action. The United States Supreme
Court, in interpreting the Sherman Act, held that "Person" or "persons" should be
interpreted to include associations existing under the law; and they further con-
cluded that "associations" included "unincorporated associations."
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give consent. The situation relative to the legality of secondary
boycotts in intrastate commerce has fluctuated some in the past,
partly because the state courts have made an effort to follow
national policy. At present, a secondary boycott by a labor organi-
zation would probably be justifiable only if the party against
whom such action were taken was, in the eyes of the courts,
virtually inseparable from another employer against whom the
union had taken some type of permissible primary action. In
brief, it may be noted that only the courts, and neither the
statute nor the Department of Industrial Relations, can define an
unfair labor practice.
There is one legislative control over the internal functions of
unions, passed as a result of labor-management differences during
the construction of the AEC projects in western Kentucky. Any
labor organization with 100 or more members in good standing in
the state, must have a local organization in the state. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals has given a rather broad meaning to this
law and has said that, even though a national or international
union does have a local union in the state, another local must be
chartered if more than 100 members in another locality are not
members of the existing local.
The conciliation and mediation service in the Kentucky De-
partment of Industrial Relations, although seemingly rather active
at one time, appears at present to be not much more than a thing
ignored. It functions only at the request of both parties to a
dispute, as does the election machinery (a mediation and con-
ciliation device in Kentucky) noted above. The Court of Appeals,
which made the policy as to elections, has made some effort to
encourage the arbitration of industrial disputes; but it is not pos-
sible to enforce a collective bargaining agreement that would sub-
stitute completely the arbitration process for judicial procedure.
The state's banding and confederating act has never been
used extensively in labor-management disputes. But one body of
principles, outside labor legislation as such and the criminal code
as it applies to violence and other type criminal activity, im-
portant in a labor relations context is the law of agency. The legal
status of unions in the state is not clearly defined. There is, for
example, considerable disagreement as to the conditions under
which a union, in its own name, can sue or be sued. If the courts
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hold strictly to the common law doctrine of agency, unions are
outside the position of becoming a party to a lawsuit. The Court
of Appeals in one instance, however, found a basis for bypassing
the strict interpretation-a basis for lending to the union a legal
personality.
PART IV
AREAS OF PROPOSED CHANGE IN PUBLIC POLICY
One method of evaluating suggested changes in public policy
is to examine them in the light of experience. Virtually every pro-
posed change in Kentucky policy that would necessitate new legis-
lation has been tried in other states. And almost every piece of
labor legislation at the federal level has been patterned after, or
preceded by, similar state legislation. It has been suggested also
that states may quite properly experiment with such laws and
that Congress may quite properly take advantage of the results
of such experimentation in drafting federal legislation.
Suggestions for change in Kentucky law relating to the prob-
lems and theory of labor-management relations have been made
by numerous persons and associations. During the 1954 session
of the Kentucky General Assembly, two bills relating to labor-
management relations were introduced.'0 8 The passage of either
bill would have caused considerable change in existing public
policy. There have been other suggestions for change in Ken-
tucky policy, but most have never been formally considered by
the legislature. It is quite unlikely, however, that any major pro-
visions of the federal law or of the several state laws have escaped
the attention of interested persons. In many instances it is pos-
sible to give credit to the many persons or groups that have in-
corporated some of the provisions discussed in a plan for the
statutory atmosphere of labor-management relations in Ken-
tucky.10 9 In other instances it is not possible because policy
108 Kentucky Right to Work Act (H.B. 225 and S.B. 103); and a labor re-
lations act, popularly referred to as "The Little Wagner Act" (H.B. 389).
109 Statements of suggested change in public policy, other than the two bills
noted above, include (a) the annual reports and other publications of the Ken-
tucky State Federation of Labor, the CIO, the A. F. of L., and of several inter-
national unions- (b) a report of the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce Labor Com-
mittee; and (c) a resolution adopted by the Kentucky Farm Bureau at its 1955
annual convention. Also employed as source materials in this and in other chapters,
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changes are frequently advocated without a spelling-out of the
detail necessary to implement such a policy."0
MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION
Mediation and conciliation provide for a third party to a dis-
pute whose sole function is to bring the parties to an agreement
through the bargaining process. Most states provide for some
sort of mediation service to facilitate the settlement of disputes
between management and labor. Although in some states the
laws have proved rather ineffective because of the small use made
of the service, there are instances also where the mediation and
conciliation service has functioned rather successfully.
There are major variations from state to state in the operation
of the mediation machinery. It may, for example, be administered
by the same staff that administers other labor laws, or it may be
designed to operate as an independent unit of state government.
In some instances a strike notice of perhaps 10 or 80 days must
be filed with the mediation service, and the mediators must be
called in in an effort to settle the dispute-in other words, com-
pulsory mediation. In some states use is made of fact-finding
boards; in some, the mediation service can take part in a dispute
only after its services are requested by both parties.
In determining the type of mediation and conciliation service
most desirable, a few basic facts must be kept in the forefront. A
strike over wages or conditions of employment-an economic strike
-is usually a manifestation of the forces of a market in operation.
The main purpose to be served by mediation is the settlement of
disputes without resorting to a show of strength. Extensive use of
mediators in labor disputes may tend to prevent strikes, and such
use may also encourage a reliance on government for the settle-
ment of private issues.
For the most satisfactory results, a state mediation and con-
ciliation service should probably be administered by an agency
are the suggestions of many representatives of management, of organized labor,
and of "the general public" secured through personal interviews and by cor-
respondence.
110 See, for example, L. Reed Tripp, J. Keith Mann, and Frederick T. Downs,
Labor-Management Relations in the Paducah Area of Western Kentucky, Bureau
of Business Research Bulletin No. 28 (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1954),
p. 76.
KENTuCxy LABOR LEGISLATION
other than that administering other labor legislation.'11 There is
little to indicate, by comparing the results under various state
acts, that strike notices and cooling-off periods have lessened
labor-management strife." 2 It is also doubtful whether compul-
sory mediation does any more than add a third party to many
labor-management negotiations.113
EMTLOYEE REPRESENTATION AND ELECTIONS
Machinery for conducting representation elections to deter-
mine whether the employees wish to be represented by a union
for collective bargaining purposes is provided in nearly every
state. Usually the choice in such an election is between one or
two particular unions and no union. In most states, however, a
representation election may be held only at the request of both
the employer and the employees; and, as a general rule, few such
elections are held where these conditions prevail.
In the states"14 that allow representation elections at the re-
quest of either the employer or the employees, the procedure,
basically, is similar to that followed under the National Labor Re-
lations Act of 1935. 1
The great differences in election provisions are confined to
just a few issues, "including employer election petitions, the cir-
cumstances under which an election may be ordered, the de-
termination of the appropriate bargaining unit, the manner of
conducting elections, and court review of certifications." 16 In
large firms (those in interstate commerce), all of these issues may
be extremely important; but in small firms (those over which
states may have jurisdiction in such matters) there is a tendency
Ill Leland J. Gordon, "Recent Developments in Conciliation and Arbitration,"
Labor in Postwar America (Brooklyn: Remsen Press, 1949), p. 216. This, in part,
is a discussion of the Labor-Management Conference of 1945 during which the
representatives of both sides unanimously agreed that the Federal Conciliation
Service should be in the Department of Labor, not administered by the NLRB.
See also 62 Monthly Labor Review, 42 (1946).
112 Charles C. Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 280.
113 George W. Taylor, Government Regulation of Industrial Relations (New
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1948), p. 92. See also Allan Weigenfeld, "Mediation or
Meddling," 7 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 288-293 (1954).
114 Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin.
115 49 Stat. 449 (1935), usually referred to as the Wagner Act.
16 Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 145.
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for some to become less of a problem, or problems that may very
well be solved by administrative fiat or through the collective
bargaining process. The way employer election petitions are
handled is an important issue at any level. Originally, under the
federal law and some of the early state laws, no provision was
made for honoring employer petitions. 117 Unrestricted employer
petitions can have the effect of undermining the organizational
activities of a union by requesting an election before a majority
of the employees have been sold on the idea of collective bargain-
ing. But there are instances also where the denial of an employer
petition can result in a hardship on the employer, as for example,
where there are two unions that claim to represent the employees
and neither will petition for an election. The employer is in the
middle even though he may be making every effort to comply
with the law.
Because disputes over representation arise over differences as
to "basic principles," they have been recognized as one of the
types most difficult to settle."18 An important question that gives
rise to this difficulty is that of voter eligibility. In most state laws
where election procedures are spelled out, the agency administer-
ing the law (usually a state labor relations board) has the au-
thority to determine voter qualifications. The problems occasioned
by seasonal employment, temporary employment, or part-time em-
ployment can usually be settled administratively with little dif-
ficulty. But determining the eligibility of persons on strike may
present a quite different set of problems. This question seems
also to be determined by those administering the law. Laws, sub-
stantially similar as to the definition of employee, have been in-
terpreted quite differently." 9 In New York, for example, a person
legally on strike is usually eligible to vote in representation elec-
tions and any replacement of the striking employee is not eligi-
ble; 120 but in Pennsylvania, an employee on strike may not vote
and his replacement may.'2 ' Quite frequently both the employee
117NLRB, Rules and Regulations, Effective July 14, 1939, Sec. 2 (b) (5);
and Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 151. 118 Taylor, op. cit., p. 91.
119 York Laws, chap. 443, see. 701 (3); and Pennsylvania Laws, P.L.
1168, sec. 3 (c).
120 Matter of Ross, et al., 15 New York State Labor Relations Board No. 42
(1952); and New York State Department of Labor, "Majority Representation," 27
Industrial Bulletin 29 (1949).
121 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Seventh Annual Report (1943), p.
20.
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on strike and the person who replaced him are declared eligible
to vote in representation elections. 22
The appropriate unit for collective bargaining is determined
in Pennsylvania by the State Labor Relations Board, 23 but the
basis for determining the bargaining unit "should depend on such
factors as unity of interest, common control, independent opera-
tion,... character of work, unity of labor relations, and past col-
lective bargaining history in the plant and in the same indus-
try."124 The Pennsylvania act and most of the other state labor
relations acts that define "appropriate unit" have a "craft-unit
proviso" that requires the board to designate a single craft as the
appropriate bargaining unit if a majority of the employees of a
particular craft so choose.' 25 The Wisconsin act gives the state
board no power to determine the appropriate unit; but the board
must determine whether a group of employees, as defined in the
election petition, constitutes an appropriate unit for collective
bargaining purposes. 2  The standards employed are similar to
those relied on by the Pennsylvania board. Most state labor rela-
tions acts grant the administrative agency considerable power to
define the appropriate bargaining unit subject to certain standards
such as in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
UNION SECURITY
On November 7, 1944, Florida became the first state to make
the denial of work because of membership or nonmembership
in a labor organization an illegal act.12 7 Since then, 16 other
stateS' 18 have adopted similar provisions-some, as in Florida, by
amending the state constitution, and others by legislation. Such
provisions, popularly referred to as "right-to-work" laws, outlaw
122 Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 208.
12 3 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Sixteenth Annual Report (1952), p.
32.
124 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Britton's Cleaner's Employees, Case
No. 60 (1952).
125 Pennsylvania Laws, P.L. 1168, sec. 7 (b).
126 Digest of Decisions of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board and
the Courts Involving the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, May 12, 1939-Dec. 31,
1953 (2nd ed.; Madison: June 1, 1954), p. 110.
127 Florida Constitution, sec. 12 (1947).
128 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, and Virginia.
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the closed shop, the union shop, and usually every other type of
agreement technically referred to as "union security" agreements.
In the history of labor legislation, few issues have commanded the
attention of the labor and management organizations, as well as
the general public, as have these state anti-union security pro-
visions.
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947120 outlaws the
closed shop in firms in interstate commerce. This act, while mak-
ing it impossible for states to legalize the closed shop, has a pro-
vision' 30 that allows states to enact laws that prohibit other types
of union security provisions. And such laws cover firms in both
interstate and intrastate commerce.
Some of the arguments-both for and against such laws-are
sound. But because of the extreme emotional appeals of both
sides, objective evaluation of the pros and cons is difficult. The
arguments usually presented by those favoring the adoption of
state laws prohibiting union security provisions in labor-manage-
ment collective bargaining agreements are:
1. An individual must not be deprived of his right to work
even though he may not choose to join a union.
2. Such laws encourage industrial growth. This argument
is used primarily by supporters in southern states.
3. The number of strikes will be reduced.
4. There will be an improvement in labor-management re-
lations.
5. Union security agreements are not in the public interest.
6. The enactment of provisions restricting the right of em-
ployers and employees to enter into union security agree-
ments represents a healthy return to the states of govern-
mental control over collective bargaining relationships.
In opposition to these laws-and it should be pointed out here
that opposition is not confined to labor organizations, just as those
favoring such laws are not confined to employer organizations-
the arguments are:
1. The advocates are not interested in anyone's right to a
job-that "right-to-work" is actually a phrase designed to
misrepresent the issue involved in order to gain public
support.
129 61 Stat. 136, sec. 8 (a) (3).
130 1bid., sec. 14 (b).
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2. Union security provisions in collective bargaining agree-
ments should be allowed if agreed upon by the parties
in negotiations.
3. There has been no decline in strike incidence that can be
directly attributed to the existence of these laws.
4. States should not have control over collective bargaining
in industries in interstate commerce.
5. If a union is the bargaining agent of a particular group
of employees, it must represent the nonmembers as well
as the members; and nonmembers share equally in the
higher wages and improved working conditions which
result from labor-management negotiations.
6. Such laws do not promote industrialization.
These arguments, for and against the abolition of union
security agreements, are by no means exhaustive. But they are,
perhaps, rather typical of those most frequently presented. The
role of union security agreements must, in the final analysis, rest
upon the prevailing concept of proper public policy. Laws re-
stricting union security agreements have, for the most part, been
enacted in the least industrialized states which are generally the
states where labor is least organized. If unions and collective
bargaining are regarded as socially desirable, and current national
public policy would suggest they are, then "right-to-work" laws
at the state level violate this policy. But if it is to be assumed
that the activities of labor unions should be curbed somewhat-
that if the bargaining power of unions is now greater than is
socially desirable-the case for such laws is on much firmer
ground. From an analysis of numerous books and articles written
expressly and admittedly for the purpose of promoting a par-
ticular point of view, it would appear that many persons and
organizations begin with particular philosophical and economic
beliefs and search out a basis to support these premises. Some
proponents, for example, "predict that under laws prohibiting
compulsory unionism, unions will not become weaker, but rather
will seek and gain a more genuine base of worker support-a
voluntary one."'31 It is no secret that the goal of "right-to-work"
advocates is not to strengthen labor unions. And a common argu-
ment of the unions relates to the compulsion under law to bargain
131 Earl F. Cheit, "Union Security and the Right to Work," 6 Labor Law
Journal, 400 (1955).
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for all employees in the bargaining unit. "Yet, who can recall a
single union argument to the effect that it should bargain for its
members only? ... How vigorously and effectively... do unions
represent non-members in the bargaining unit?"
1'32
In January, 1955, the National Right-to-Work Committee was
organized "to establish in the United States that Americans must
have the right, but not be compelled, to join unions."-3" About
three months later it was claimed by this committee that the 12
states with anti-union security laws since 1947 "have in many
cases registered substantial gains in employment, income, earn-
ings, population, and business growth and the greatest average
reduction of workless days due to labor disputes." 134 Other re-
ports by advocates of such laws make similar claims. 35 But in-
dividuals and organizations in opposition to anti-union security
laws make similarly strong claims supporting their position. The
Governor of Massachusetts, speaking in opposition to a right-to-
work bill that failed to get out of committee, stated that the bill
was ill-advised-that if enacted it would create industrial strife.1
3
0
And the Governor of Alabama, in a public statement on May 4,
1955, asked for repeal of the "right-to-work" law in his state be-
cause it had increased industrial unrest and strikes.'
37 Many at-
tacks by labor organizations on proposed and existing anti-union
security measures are as vigorous and uncompromising as are
many of the supporting statements. 3" Another attack on these
laws has been made on the grounds that they are unenforceable. 3"
132 Selwyn H. Torff, "The Case for Voluntary Union Membership," 40 Iowa
Law Review, 621 (1955). This article is one part of a dual review oi The Case
Against "Right to Work" Laws (Congress of Industrial Organizations, no date),
pp. 169. For another rather complete analysis of this type legislation, in which the
author concludes it is "undesirable legislation," see Maurice C. Benewity, "Nature
and Effect of State Right-to-Work Laws," 1 Wayne Law Review, 165-186 (1955).
133New York Times, CIV (January 29, 1955).
.34 Ibid. (April 13, 1955).
135 See, for example, Missouri State Chamber of Commerce, Research Report,
No. 25 (Jefferson City: March 18, 1954); and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, States
Rights in Labor Relations, Information Bulletin No. 26 (Washington: March 28,
1954).
136 New York Times, CIV (March 1, 1955).
'-37 Ibid. (May 4, 1955).
138Th views and arguments of the Congress of Industrial Organizations are
presented in rather complete detail in the organization's publication, The Case
Against "Right to Work" Laws. As an answer to the anti-union security bill intro-
duced in the 1954 Kentucky Legislature, the Kentucky State Federation of Labor
published Labor's Arguments Against "Bosses' Folly."
'39See John M. Kuhlman, "Right-to-Work' Laws: The Virginia Experience,"
6 Labor Law Journal, 453-461 and 494 (1955).
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Many observers, and indeed some labor leaders, believe the union
security issue will receive more attention in the coming year than
will any other legislative or political goal sought by organized
labor generally.
UNFAm LAB R PIAcncEs
The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 contained only em-
ployer unfair labor practices-there were no comparable provisions
to restrict the activities of employees and unions. It was pre-
sumed, evidently, by the sponsors of the act that there were
ample restrictions on the activities of labor embodied in other
federal and state laws and in the general nature of the labor mar-
ket. But the state labor relations acts passed between 1935 and
1947 reflect, in general, a quite different attitude. And on the
national level this attitude is expressed by the enumeration in the
1947 act of unfair labor practices of a labor organization or its"
agents.140
When the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 was
passed (actually this is an amendment to the 1935 act) little con-
sideration was given to outright repeal of the existing statute.
"Restrictions against unfair labor practices by the employer had
to be continued as a practical matter."' 4' There was considerable
evidence that the balance of power had shifted too far to the side
of organized labor; but correction was in the form of restricting
the activities of labor rather than a lifting of the restrictions (gen-
erally speaking) on the employer. The economic strength and
the vast memberships of labor unions by 1947 were due in part,
undoubtedly, to the "one-sidedness" of the 1935 act. But other
factors probably played important roles, particularly the growth
of industrial unions and later the high level of the national
economy. To curb the activities of unions because the changed
philosophy of union organization had resulted in a situation that
in 1935 was unpredictable is understandable. To curb the activi-
ties of labor organizations because they were momentarily bene-
fited by a high-level war economy (an economy quite unlike that
of even the most prosperous years of peace) is something else.
140 LMRA, sec. 8 (b).
141 Taylor, op. cit., p. 254.
KENTrucKy LAW JOURNAL
The complexities of labor legislation and the economic and
social consequences of the various proposed and current pro-
visions cannot be overemphasized. This is particularly true in the
realm of unfair practices. The LMRA, for example, makes it an
unfair practice, subject to certain provisions, for an employer to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees.' 42 But even this provision, which at a glance would ap-
pear rather clear in its meaning to require an employer to bargain
collectively with employee representatives over terms and condi-
tions of employment, may involve considerable difference of
opinion as to whether certain specific issues are or are not bargain-
able.
The unfair labor practices for both the employers and the
employees or unions forbidden by the several state labor relations
acts143 are shown in Table 2. It should be noted that many of
these practices, and particularly those applying to employees and
unions, are forbidden in other states-states that have no labor
relations act as such. Three other states144 have provisions against
jurisdictional disputes, for example, and five other states1 45 have
outlawed secondary boycotts. Many states, other than those
shown in Table 2, also have laws to control picketing, prevent
blacklisting, provide for the free organization of employees with-
out employer interference, and other such regulations.
jurisdictional disputes
Jurisdictional disputes, disputes between unions involving the
assignment of work, give rise to some of the most heated debates
-inside and outside labor union circles-as to the proper method
of settlement. As noted above, they have been outlawed in several
states. But there is great difference of opinion as to whether this
is a proper area for government regulation and control. Those
who favor governmental action usually base their case on the fact
142 Sec. 8 (a) (5).
143 A state labor relations act, to be here classified as such, must be similar in
several respects to either the NLRA (1935) or the LMRA (1947). Most other
states have some type labor legislation but these 'laws differ from the labor rela-
tions acts in that they are aimed exclusively at one or a few union practices, place
few or no restrictions on employers, and do not attempt to establish a compre-
hensive labor relations policy.' (Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 3).
144 California, Florida, and Iowa. Some state control of jurisdictional strikes
in Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota. 33 LRRM 3028.
145 Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, North Dakota, and Texas. 33 LRRM 3023.
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that the employer, even though he may favor and have good re-
lations with the unions, is usually caught in the middle and with-
out recourse. If the disputed work is assigned to union "A," union
"B" will go on strike; if assigned to union "B," union "A" will
strike. In either case it is likely that all, or most all, work on the
particular project or shop will be halted.
Persons opposing any regulation by government base their
case on the fact that the jurisdiction of craft unions is an internal
matter-an issue to be settled within and by the unions and federa-
tions involved. It is argued also that the time-loss from jurisdic-
tional strikes is overstated, that the absolute number of strikes is
no indication of the severity of the problem because most are of
extremely short duration;'4 6 and that the public may be quite
unaware of the importance of the outcome of the dispute to the
unions and workers involved. The last major argument of organ-
ized labor is that the action of government in such situation is
typically slow-that the particular job may be completed before a
decision can be given.'47
Considerable action has been taken to correct jurisdictional
troubles, particularly by the craft unions in the A.F. of L. Similar
action has been taken by the CIO and between the two federa-
tions.14 8 Like so many other economic and social situations that
are, in part, a result of changing technology, there appears to be
no easy solution to the problem. Thousands of workers each year
are involved in situations that could easily result in jurisdictional
disputes simply because a new method was devised for doing an
old job, or different materials and equipment have replaced those
previously employed.
Minnesota, as a part of its labor relations act, tried to solve the
jurisdictional strike problem through arbitration.'49 The labor
14
0 Tripp, Mann, and Downs, op. cit., p. 63.
147 In a case involving a jurisdictional dispute between two unions over a
work assignment that resulted in a strike on January 3, 1953, a NLRB decision was
banded down on August 11, 1954. The board said the dispute was properly before
it for determination, "even though the particular job that gave rise to the dispute
has been completed." (109 NLRB 118).
148 For a summary of several of these agreements as well as the text, see 33
LRRM 80-83, and 34 LRRM 26-41. Since this chapter was first written, the CIO
and the A.F. of L. have merged into a single federation. Article III of the AFL-
CIO Constitution covers the settlement of jurisdictional disputes.
140 Jack W. Stieber, Ten Years of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act, Bulletin
9, Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 8.
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organizations could submit the issue to any federation or inter-
national union with which they are both affiliated or to an arbitra-
tion tribunal. If this was not done, the Governor could appoint
an arbitrator to settle the controversy. But "it is apparent that the
Minnesota statute has not resolved the problem of jurisdictional
disputes." 50
In 1947151 Pennsylvania made jurisdictional strikes an unfair
labor practice. There were 59 unfair labor practice charges
brought before the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board in 1952.
Of these, 55 were ified against employers and four against unions.
One of the charges against unions came about as a result of a
jurisdictional dispute. The charge was not processed as an unfair
practice but settled by a representation election at the request of
the employer. 52 It is difficult, from the Pennsylvania and other
state reports, 53 to determine just how effective the provisions out-
lawing jurisdictional strikes are. It would appear, however, that
very few such cases are processed by the courts or by state boards
of labor relations; but in the states that have no statute banning
jurisdictional strikes, there is some resort to the use of injunctions
as a means of control, as for example, in Texas.'5 4
Secondary boycotts
Just as jurisdictional strikes have been outlawed by statute in
some states and can be held to a minimum by the use of injunc-
tions and restraining orders in some of the others, a second type
of economic pressure-the secondary boycott-has been held by
some legislatures and courts to be against the public interest on
much the same grounds. A secondary boycott "implies the re-
fusal of one party to deal with another unless such other will, in
turn, refuse to deal with a third."'55 It is a means of applying eco-
150 Ibid., p. 28.
'51 Act 558, L. 1947. Labor Relations Act as Amended, sec. 6 (e).
152 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Sixteenth Annual Report (1952), p.
111.
153 There were, for example, no unfair labor practices under the Wisconsin
Employment Peace Act, sec. 111.06 (2) (1), "to engage in, promote, or induce a
jurisdictional strike," reported in the board's Annual Report for the year ending
June 30, 1954.
154 Lionel E. Gilley, "Jurisdictional Disputes," 2 Southwestern Law Journal,
128 (1948).
155 See Charles 0. Gregory, Labor and the Law (New York: W. W. Norton
and Company, Inc., 1946), p. 34, and Chaps. V and VI, pp. 105-157, for an
excellent analysis of the problem.
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nomic pressure on a third party, through a second, if he does not
meet the demands of the first. Actually there are two rather dis-
tinct types of secondary boycotts practiced by organized labor.
The first may be referred to as the secondary labor boycott, and
may be illustrated by a situation where union plumbers would
refuse to work with materials manufactured by a nonunion shop.
The other type-the secondary consumption boycott-may be illus-
trated by a plea from one or more unions or federations that the
members refrain from buying a particular product because the
employer is "unfair" to organized labor. Secondary boycotts may
be defined broadly so as to cover most any boycott situation; or
they may be defined by statute so as to make some secondary
practices legal and some illegal. In some states primary boycotts
are likewise outlawed.
15 6
The ability of a union to apply economic pressure through
combination and concerted action is basic to the labor union
movement. The strike and the boycott are the most important
and effective means of applying such pressure, and it is often dif-
ficult to draw a line between these types of activity. Frequently
both primary and secondary action may be taken in a single dis-
pute. President Truman, in his message to the Eightieth Congress,
asked for the outlawing of "unjustifiable" secondary boycotts, par-
ticularly those called in connection with a jurisdictional dispute.8 7
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the LMRA as it was enacted, the so-
called secondary boycott provision, does not contain the words
"secondary boycott." This leaves the door open for different in-
terpretations by the courts, and such interpretations have been
expressed.
158
President Eisenhower, in his message to Congress on January
11, 1954, suggested that certain changes be made in the "second-
ary boycott" section of the LMRA.1 9 The bill 160 incorporating
156 See Killingsworth, op. cit., Pp. 68-75, for the application of the various
types of boycott laws in the states wi labor relations acts.
1I7 President's Message to Congress, Congressional Record, Vol. 93, Part I
(January 6, 1947), p. 136.
158 In International Rice Milling Company v. NLRB, 188 F (2d) 21 (1950),
the Court of Appeals reversed a board decision involving secondary action, but
the Supreme Court upheld the board, 341 U.S. 665 (1951). In Joliet Contractors
Association v. NLRB, .202 F (2d) 606 (1953), the Court of Appeals, while up-
holding the board's decision, implied that the legality of the union's conduct did
not binge on whether the action was primary or secondary in nature.
159) Specifically, the President asked that two types of secondary boycott be
legalized-those against employers accepting "farmed out" work from struck em-
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these changes (and others), which never became law, defined
"primary" and "secondary" employer and provided for a relaxation
of the secondary boycott ban in three respects. The analysis by
the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the pro-
posed amendments is indicative of the complexity of the secondary
boycott problem, and also of the various types of secondary pres-
sure that may be engaged in by unions.
An important type of secondary action sometimes results from
a joint action or agreement of employers and organized labor. A
group of New York City business firms combined with a union to
keep out-of-state firms from competing for business in the New
York City area. Under the federal anti-trust laws this action was
declared illegal because it tended to create a monopoly in a par-
ticular market. 161
As noted above, several states have made secondary boycotts
an unfair labor practice, an illegal act, or both. It has been sug-
gested by one writer that the Minnesota law,162 which outlaws
virtually every type of secondary activity that organized labor
may engage in, is unfair in that it "apparently prohibits labor
organizations from engaging in types of activity which are not
denied employers." 63 Some states, in their efforts to control the
secondary activities of organized labor, have enacted a "hot cargo"
law. Such a law makes illegal an agreement between employers
and employees that in effect states that the employees shall not
be obliged to handle the merchandise of a struck employer. The
courts, however, have held that such agreements do not violate
the federal anti-trust acts.6 The California "Hot Cargo and
Secondary Boycotts" act 65 was declared invalid because it was too
broad in scope;'66 and in 1953 a California court held that the
refusal of truck drivers to cross a picket line to deliver beer to a
ployers, and those against employers engaged on construction projects with struck
employers. For an analysis critical of these suggestions see John A. Lloyd, Jr.,
"Public Policy and Secondary Boycotts," 28 University of Cincinnati Law Review,
31-54 (1954).
160 Senate Bill 2650, reported out favorably by Senate Labor Committee on
March 31, 1954, defeated, May 7, 1954, by a vote of 50 to 42.
161 Allen-Bradley Company v. Local Union No. 3, 347 U.S. 797 (1954).
162 Minnesota Laws (1947), chap. 486.
163 Stieber, op. cit., p. 28.
164 Meier and Poblmann Furniture Co. v. Gibbons, 113 F. Supp. 409 (1953).
165 Deering's California Code: Labor, Vol. 1, sees. 1131-1136.
166 In re Blaney, 30 Calif. (2d) 648 (1947).
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struck cocktail lounge was not a violation of the California anti-
trust laws.' 8 ' The court, in this case, said the boycott was lawful
on the grounds that the "action was reasonably relevant to work-
ing conditions and purposes of collective bargaining."
States that do not have a statute defining the legal and illegal
secondary activities of labor unions must also, of course, deal with
such problems. An example is a recent Ohio case where an em-
ployer asked that a labor union be enjoined from picketing his
place of business. Such picketing was being done for the purpose
of pursuading the employer to hire union help. The lower courts
of the state refused the injunction but the decision was reversed
by the Ohio Supreme Court. 8 But the wording of the decision
leaves the impression that the court may, even under similar cir-
cumstances, take quite another position. 9
Picketing
A discussion of the various types of picketing that are, or may
be, classified as unlawful or as unfair labor practices under state
law should, perhaps, be prefaced by a few remarks on the status of
picketing generally. It will be recalled that the "free speech"
doctrine reached its highest point about 1940, and that a Supreme
Court decision 170 in 1942 marked the first major departure away
from this doctrine. In this decision the court pointed up that a
legislature may constitutionally prohibit picketing if, in its judg-
ment, such action is necessary for the protection of the community
as a whole.
This doctrine was enlarged upon in 1950 when, in three
cases,1 7 ' the Supreme Court decided it was quite proper to pro-
hibit picketing for any objective, "apparently, deemed unsound by
107 Sehweiger v. Joint Executive Board, Calif. Dist. Court of Appeals (1958),
83 LRRM 2200.
108 Anderson Sons Co. v. Local Union No. 811, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 104 N.E. (2d) (Ohio) 22 (1952).
16 Ibid., p. 83. "The rule in this state as to secondary boycotts, which, from
a review of decided cases seems to have become a state policy, is summarized in
24 Ohio Jurisprudence, 676, Section 61, as follows: '... . The view now prevailing
in most of courts in this country is that secondary boycotts may not lawfully be
employed in a labor dispute. And this is the view adopted by the majority of
cases in Ohio.'" (Italics added.)
170 Carpenters Union, A.F. of L. v. Bitter's Cafe, 815 U.S. 722 (1942).
171 International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union, Local 809 v. Hanke, 839
U.S. 470 (1950); Building Service Employees International Union, Local 262 v.
Gazzam, 839 U.S. 532 (1950); and Hughes v. Superior Court, 889 U.S. 460
(1950).
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the legislature, or by the court."72 In the Hanke case, originating
in the state of Washington, picketing against an operator with no
employees was declared enjoinable even though there was no state
law to prohibit such action. In the Gazzam case, originating in
Oregon, a state law prohibited employer coercion of nonunion
workers but was silent on coercion if applied by employees or a
union; but picketing to persuade an employer to require his em-
ployees to join a union was not allowed. In the Hughes case, from
California, picketing an employer to persuade him to hire Negro
help in proportion to his Negro customers was enjoined; the
United States Supreme Court upheld the injunction.
These cases are cited as examples of some of the restrictions
on peaceful picketing and to show that the once-prevailing free
speech doctrine no longer occupies, as it once did, the exalted
position in the eyes of the Supreme Court. The phrase "restric-
tions on peaceful picketing" is apt because mass picketing and
violence, even though restrictions on such practices are outlawed
in some state labor statutes, have never been seriously considered
by the courts to be legal procedures. Some restrictions of peace-
ful picketing are implicit in the previous discussions of jurisdic-
tional disputes and boycotts. But primary interest here is centered
about the restrictions on peaceful picketing under other circum-
stances. Three types of picketing that have the status of being
an unfair labor practice-mass picketing, picketing in a minority
strike, and picketing beyond the industry-in one or more states
are listed in Table 2. Other types of peaceful picketing that from
time to time have been held to be against public policy are
stranger picketing (picketing by nonemployees) and organiza-
tional picketing.
Just as secondary boycotts are in many instances outlawed
even though the boycotting union may have a real economic in-
terest, picketing for other purposes may be held enjoinable even
though the union may again have an economic interest. Picketing
is something more than free speech, and also something more
than coercion; but the Supreme Court has made an effort to
balance equitably the constitutional protection of free speech and
the power of states to limit picketing in labor-management dis-
172 Nathan P. Feinsinger and Edwin E. Wittee, "Labor Legislation and the
Role of Government," 71 Monthly Labor Review, 56 (1950).
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putes 73 It is difficult to define, at this time, the power of states
to restrict peaceful picketing. In Missouri, for example, peaceful
picketing was enjoined, and the injunction upheld by the United
States Supreme Court,174 because it violated the state anti-trust
law; but at the same time the picketing was part of a union
organization campaign.
In general, it may be said that peaceful picketing is not pro-
hibited when it is in connection with a legal economic strike;
but there are restrictions in many states on even this type activity.
Mass picketing, even though peaceful, is usually illegal; picketing
must, in many states, be confined to the premises of the employer
against whom the employees are striking; picketing by nonem-
ployees is frequently forbidden or partially restricted; and, even
though the prohibition of all picketing would be unconstitutional,
there are other standards in many states that picketing procedure
must meet if it is to be wholly legal.
Stfike votes
The idea that an employee, before going on strike, should
"have an opportunity to express his free choice by secret ballot
held under government auspices"1'7 5 was incorporated in several
state laws before it was suggested as an amendment to the LMRA.
It matters little here that the President's suggestion was not made
a part of the 1954 bill'17 to amend the LMRA'
77
Seven states require that a majority of the employees voting
must be in favor of a strike before a strike can legally be called.
17 8
In some instances, as in the Colorado law,' 9 it is stated that a
majority of all employees must endorse a strike in order to make
it legal. This section of the act, however, was declared uncon-
stitutional.180 A Michigan statute'" requires that "a majority of
all employees casting valid ballots must vote in favor" of a strike.
173 International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union, Local 809 v. Hanke, 389
U.S. 470 (1950).
174 Giboney et al. v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 886 U.S. 490 (1949).
175 President's Message to Congress, Congressional Record, H. Doe. No. 291,
Vol. 100, Part 1 (January 11, 1954), p. 128.
176 Senate Bill 2650 (1954).
177 See Samual Harris Cohen, "Labor, Taft-Hartley and the Proposed Amend-
ments," 5 Labor Law Journal, 407 (1954).
178 Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Utah, and Wisconsin.
85 LRRM 8028, and Kansas Laws (1955), H.B. 402.
179 Colorado Statutes, chap. 97, sec. 94 (7) (2).
180 American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 118 Colo. 90 (1944). Declaring
this section invalid was actually secondary to a declaration by the court that unions
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Prior to 1949 the Michigan law said that a majority of all em-
ployees in the bargaining unit must vote in favor of a strike in
order to legally authorize it. Even though the law was changed to
a voting majority, the United States Supreme Court declared it
invalid 182 on the grounds that Congress has protected union con-
duct which the state has forbidden. The federal act (LMBA)
does not require majority authorization for a strike; 'legislative
history demonstrates that this proposal was rejected on its merits,
and not because of any desire to leave the states free to adopt
it."18 3 The strike-vote provision of the Wisconsin law84 has been,
in part, nullified. 85 As early as 1941, "the Wisconsin Supreme
Court sustained an unfair labor practice complaint against an
employer and held that the Board is authorized by statute to order
the remedy most consistent with the public interest." 88 And in
1948 the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board noted that the
strike-vote section of the law was designed largely "to protect
employees from arbitrary action by labor leaders."187 But as late
as 1953, violation of the strike-vote provision was held by the
Wisconsin board to be an unfair labor practice. 188
State legislation that makes a strike illegal unless authorized
by the employees may carry with it implications not readily
noticed. It may, for example, prohibit organizational picketing,
secondary and primary boycotts, prevent a minority group of em-
ployees from striking even though they may have a legitimate
grievance, and in general go far beyond "enforcing democratic
procedures in industrial disputes."'89
Refusal to bargain collectively
It has often been said that it is unsound and ill-advised for a
legislature to grant a right without imposing a corresponding
could not be forced to incorporate. The strike vote section, chap. 97, sec. 94 (7)
(2), was closely tied to the incorporation provisions, chap. 20.
181 Michigan Compiled Statutes, chap. 428, sec. 9.
182 United Automobile Workers of America, CIO v. O'Brien, 889 U.S. 454
(1950). 183 Ibid., note 5.
184Wisconsin Statutes, chap. 111, see. 06 (2) (e). It is an unfair labor
practice to call a strike, or engage in "any other overt concomitant of a strike'
unless such action is approved by a majority of the employees in the bargaining
unit.
185 See Killingsworth, op. cit., and cases cited therein.
186Appleton Chair Corp., 239 Wis. 387 (1941).
18?The Crandon Co., W.E.R.B. Decision No. 1508 (1948).
188 Struty Heating and Air Conditioning Co., W.E.R.B. Decision No. 8606
(1955). 189 Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 65.
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duty. Under the NLBA of 1935, employees were given the right
to organize without interference from the employer and the em-
ployer was obligated to bargain collectively with representatives
of the employees. When this act was amended in 1947 (the
LMBA) and the unfair practices of employees, conspicuously
absent from the original law, were added, it became an unfair
practice for employees to refuse to bargain collectively with their
employer (subject, of course, to certain conditions). None of the
several state labor relations laws specifically make it an unfair
practice for the employees to refuse to bargain collectively. There
is such a provision in a bill introduced in the Kentucky Legisla-
ture in 1954.1"°
Refusal to bargain collectively-employees. A few cases have
come before the National Labor Relations Board charging the em-
ployees or a union with the refusal to bargain collectively. In a
1950 case' 91 a union was charged with refusing to bargain when,
as a result of the failure of an employers' association and the union
to reach an agreement, the union struck against one employer in
the association. In spite of a seven-year history of association-
wide bargaining, an attempt by the union to secure a collective
bargaining agreement with one member of the association did not
constitute an unfair practice. It was merely the substitution of
one type bargaining for another. Each employer in the associa-
tion continued to be an employer under the LMRA even though
the collective bargaining function had been transferred to the
association. It is not, however, an unfair practice for a union to
refuse to bargain with a single employer if the employer is a
member of an association with which the union has an agree-
ment.
192
In a 1958 decision, the NLRB found a union in violation of
the law when insisting on the establishment of "unlawful closed-
shop conditions."193 In this case the International Typographical
Union was enjoined also from using "any means tending to inter-
fere with the establishment of genuine collective bargaining on a
190 H.B. No. 389.
191 Morand Brothers Beverage Co., et al., 91 NLRB 409 (1950).
192 NLRB Administrative Ruling, Case No. 993, July 29, 1954 (34 LERM
1439).
193 International Typographical Union (American Newspaper Publishers
Ass'n), 104 NLRB 806 (1953).
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basis of mutuality." This case was the result of a long history of
union control over some aspects of employment conditions which
conflicted with parts of the LMRA.194
Refusal to bargain collectively-employer. Eight states0 5 make
the refusal of an employer to bargain collectively an unfair labor
practice. In order to determine whether or not a complaint is
based on an actual violation of this provision, it is essential, first
of all, to determine whether the employer is obligated to bargain
with the employees or union filing the complaint. The union must
be the legally designated bargaining agent of the employees, as
determined through some recognition process-usually an election.
Some attention has already been directed toward elections, ap-
propriate units, etc., and in this discussion it is assumed there is
no question of representation.
Under the state laws and the LMRA, the employer, as well as
the employee representatives, to fulfill his legal obligation, must
bargain in "good faith." "The Act [LMRA] does not compel either
party to agree to the other's proposal. It only requires the parties
to confer in good faith.""" Under the LMRA, however, the em-
ployer is required to present a counterproposal to the demands of
the employees and show evidence of more than just "going
through the motions of collective bargaining."9 7 And obligations
under the LMRA can only be fulfilled if "the parties come to the
bargaining table with a fair open mind and a sincere desire and
purpose to conclude an agreement on mutually satisfactory
terms."9 " Similar language was used by the New York Labor Re-
lations Board in stating that the employer has the duty to meet
and negotiate with employee representatives. 9 The New York
board also holds, ordinarily, to the doctrine that it is the obliga-
tion of the union to make the first move in negotiating a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 00 Changes in wage rates or working
194 For a rather complete background and analysis of this situation, see Arthur
R. Porter, Jr., Job Property Rights, A Study of the Job Controls of the International
Typographical Union (New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1954),
pp. 8-15. 195 See Table 2.
196 Old Line Life Insurance Co. of America, 96 NLRB No. 66 (1951).
197 Armstrong and Hand, Inc. and District Lodge 37, International Associa-
tion of Machinists, 104 NLRB 420 (1953).
198 Shannon and Simpson Casket Co., 99 NLRB No. 62 (1952).
199 In Matter of Stanyione, 15 SLRB (N.Y.) No. 13 (1952).
200 New York State Labor Relations Board, Sixteenth Annual Report for the
year ended December 81, 1952 (Albany: 1953), p. 59.
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conditions initiated by the employer without consulting repre-
sentatives of the employees may be an unfair practice, provided
the employer has recognized and dealt with the union previous
to such action.201 Other decisions that shed light on the operation
of state laws as regards the refusal of an employer to bargain
show that where there is reasonable doubt that the union still
represents a majority of the employees, the employer could refuse
to bargain until the state board had ruled on the question of
representation; 20 2 that the insistence by the employer that certain
terms be included or excluded from the agreement does not in
itself constitute an unfair practice; 203 that the granting of a wage
increase after refusing to meet with the majority union and pro-
moting the withdrawal of employees from the union is unfair;204
and that a refusal to bargain may be based on an employer refusal
to enter into wage negotiations on the reopening of a collective
bargaining contract, when the employer made no counter-pro-
posal to the union and refused to participate in arbitration pro-
ceedings under the existing agreement. 20 5 All of these cases, in a
rather general way, help point up the basis of "good faith" bar-
gaining. There is no way of defining "good faith" bargaining or
"refusal to bargain" that will fit every circumstance; but the cases,
as they arise at either the state or federal level, must be decided
on their merits.
One of the questions involving the employer's obligation to
bargain collectively has to do with bargainable issues. The LMRA
requires that the employer bargain with the representatives of his
employees "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment."200 It is in connection with
the latter clause that most disagreements as to bargainable issues
arise. Many of these disagreements have centered around issues
relating to those that have become popularly known as "fringe
benefits." Company houses, for example, have been held to come
201 In Matter of Stanyione, 15 SLRB (N.Y.) No. 13 (1952).
202 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Anchorage, Inc., Pennsylvania
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County (1952), cited in 31 LRRM 2145.
203 Ibid.
204 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Hall's Furniture Store, Inc., 78
Pennsylvania District and County Reports 241 (1951).
205 Purity Food Co. v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, Con-
necticut Superior Court, Fairfield County (1951), cited in 28 LRRM 2094.
200 See. 9 (a).
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within the scope of collective bargaining only when "their owner-
ship and management materially affect conditions of employ-
ment."20 7 Pensions and insurance plans, 208 union security,2 9 profit
sharing, ° vacations, 21' and many other issues have been found
by the NLRB and the courts to be "conditions of employment"
and, therefore, bargainable.
As noted above, only eight of the states with labor relations
acts make it an unfair practice for an employer to refuse to bargain
collectively. It is possible that the acts of the other four states
are designed to equate bargaining power in this one respect be-
cause in no state is it illegal for representatives of the employees
to refuse to bargain collectively. There is, however, an important
difference. Most, or in the first instance virtually all, of the issues
discussed in a collective bargaining session are raised by the em-
ployee representatives. Traditionally, this is the way collective
bargaining works. Allowing an employer legally to refuse to bar-
gain is quite different from allowing the employee representatives
to refuse. In some instances, as for example in Kansas,212 it is an
unfair practice for anyone "to violate the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement." If a collective bargaining agreement in
Kansas or other states with the same legal provision carries the
provision that both parties bargain "collectively as to the rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, and working conditions",21 the
fact that such a provision (employer refusal to bargain collec-
tively as an unfair practice) is not included in the law renders it
less offensive to the contracting union.
207 In NLBB v. Bemis Bros. Bag Co., 206 F. (2d) 33 (1953), the housing
issue was declared not bargainable; in NLRB v. Lehigh Portland Cement Co.,
205 F. (2d) 821 (1953), the company was guilty of an unfair labor practice when
it refused to bargain on housing.
208 "It is well settled by now that pensions and insurance benefits are bargain-
able issues ... " in Matter of Babylon Cleaners, Inc., et al., 15 SLRB (N.Y.) No.
98 (1952).
209 ". . . one of the factors establishing the employer's lack of good faith was
its attitude with regard to the union's request for a union security clause." In
Matter of Sena Beauty Salon, Inc., 15 SLRB (N.Y.) No. 125 (1952).
210 NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F. 2d 523 (1954).
211 The employer changed the method of computing vacation pay without
consulting the union and thereby committed unfair practice. Phelps Dodge Prod-
ucts Corp., 101 NLRB No. 103 (1952).
212 From Kansas Laws (1955), H.B. 102 (effective July 1, 1955). Codified
as sec. 44-809 (15) in General Statutes.
218 This phrase is from a collective bargaining agreement between a manu-
facturer and an American Federation of Labor international union.
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Interference with employees in their right to organize
Eleven state laws 214 and the federal law have a provision that
makes interference an unfair labor practice. As in many other in-
stances, it is not the wording of the law but the various interpreta-
tions and the general trend, if any, in the degree of interference
permitted that requires explanation.
During the early years of the NLRA, the NLRB interpreted
this provision as outlawing almost every conceivable type of em-
ployer interference. But in 1941, the United States Supreme Court
reversed an NLRB decision,215 breaking the ground for greater
freedom of speech by employers relative to organized labor. The
employer's remarks could not be coercive, nor could they contain
implied threats or promise of economic gain. An NLRB de-
cision216 in 1946 held that an employer was in violation of the law
when he delivered an anti-union speech to his employees, com-
pulsorily assembled during working hours, one hour before a
representation election. This decision was modified by the United
States Court of Appeals to the extent that the employer was free
to speak to the employees on company time if union representa-
tives were given the same opportunity.21 1 The 1947 legislation
(LMRA) has a provision, not contained in the NLRA, which pro-
vides that any expression of views or opinions shall not constitute
an unfair practice "if such expression contains no threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit."218 In 1948 the NLRB repudiated
the Clark Bros. decision and said that the employer could make
noncoercive anti-union speeches during working hours without
granting the union the same opportunity.1 9 In 1951, the board
again changed directions 220 and reverted to the Clark Bros. doc-
trine. This new doctrine, the so-called "Bonwit Teller" rule, was
applied by the NLRB until late in 1953. At that time, the board
again held that, with certain exceptions, the employer could take
advantage of his position to speak to the employees as a "captive
audience" without being obligated to allow the union to do the
214 All of the 12 state laws except that of Minnesota. There are many other
states that have such legislation but that have no labor relations law as sueh.
215 NLRB v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
21O Clark Bros. Co. Inc., 70 NLRB No. 60 (1946).
217 NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co. Inc., 163 F. 2d 378 (1947).
218 Sec. 8 (c).
219 S & S Corrugated Paper Machinery Co., 89 NLRB No. 178 (1948).
220 Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 NLRB No. 73 (1951).
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same.2 21 Any such pre-election speech the employer makes, how-
ever, must be made more than 24 hours prior to voting time or
the election can be voided.
222
There are, of course, other ways by which an employer can
interfere with the rights of employees-by questioning them about
union activities, by enforcing rules that unduly restrict union
activities, by employing any of several methods to discourage
union activities, and by the activities of subordinates and others
acting for the employer in the capacity of agent.223
Decisions relating to employer interference under the Wis-
consin law indicates that the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board and the Wisconsin courts hold very close to the NLRB
policies. In most categories there are too few decisions to indicate
any major trend; but every case224 having to do with the question-
ing of employees concerning union activity held this to be a viola-
tion of the law. Also, the employer, under Wisconsin law, is held
to have committed acts of interference if he threatens an employee
with discharge for union activity; if he threatens, on the day of
the election, to reduce working hours or remove employee buying
privileges if the union wins; threatens to close his business if the
employees join a union; promises a wage increase during a union
organizational drive; or if he executes individual contracts with
his employees after learning that some of them belong to a
union.
22 5
The most frequent type of interference under New York law
is the discharge of persons for union activity.226 Questioning em-
ployees about union membership "in an atmosphere of hostility"
also is prohibited under New York law,227 and an employer may
not encourage his employees to become members of one union in
preference to another when both unions are trying to organize
221 Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB No. 109 (1953).
222 Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB No. 106 (1953).
223 The NLRB standards for these different types of illegal practice are dis-
cussed briefly in NLRB Nineteenth Annual Report for the year ended June 30,
1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 72-79.
224 Seven such cases, the latest dated June 1952, are listed in Digest of
Decisions of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board and the Courts Involving
the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, (2d ed., Madison: June, 1954). p. 80.
225 Ibld., pp. 81-82. Several other practices which constitute interference are
listed, as well as acts that the WERB and the courts have held to be legal after
the union has charged the employer with interference.
226 "Unfair Labor Practices," 28 Industrial Bulletin. 19 (1949).
227 Matter of City Laundry, 15 SLRB (N.Y.) No. 185 (1952).
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his plant.228 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that ob-
scene language used in expressing opposition to a union does not,
by itself, constitute an unfair practice; 229 and a threat by the em-
ployer to close his shop if the employees organize has likewise
been held a legal practice. 30 Colorado, which goes as far as, or
further than, any other state in its statute relative to interference,
gives the right to both the employer and employees "freely to
express, declare and publish their respective views and proposals
concerning any labor relationship."23 '
Discrimination against employee for union activity or for filing
charges or giving testimony under a labor relations act.
Prior to the change in national labor relations policy in 1935
and the subsequent enactment of several state labor relations
laws, the easiest way for an employer to conduct a countercam-
paign against a union that was trying to organize his employees
was for the employer to discharge, demote, or otherwise penalize
anyone who joined the union. Usually these measures proved
effective. But under virtually all the state labor relations laws
and the LMRA, employees are protected in their right to join
labor organizations; and if any employer discriminates against an
employee so'ely on the basis of the employee's exercising of this
right, the employer is guilty of an unfair labor practice. No em-
ployer is denied the right to discharge an employee for just cause;
and in Pennsylvania, for example, when the state board orders
the reinstatement of an employee it holds as having been illegally
discharged, the burden of proof before the courts is on the
board. 32 The employer does not have to prove the employee was
discharged for a specific cause.
There are literally hundreds of situations out of which a charge
of discrimination can arise. Such things as the employee's length
of service, past disciplinary record, position in the union, job
satisfaction, and attendance record are usually considered by the
boards and the courts before making a decision; but they may,
228 Matter of White Silver Wet Wash Laundry Co., Inc., 15 SLRB (N.Y.) No.
168 (1952).
"29 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Sansom House Enterprises, Inc.,
878 Pa. 385 (1954).
:230 Ibid.
231 Colorado Statutes, chap. 97, sec. 94 (7) (2).
232 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Sansom House Enterprises, Inc.,
878 Pa. 885 (1954).
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and do, consider whether or not a discharged employee was re-
placed, or whether the employer showed preference to union
members or nonmembers in giving wage increases, or the evidence
as to whether a particular shop rule is enforced against all em-
ployees.
The preceding discussion of various unfair practices of em-
ployers and employees is not exhaustive, either as to the topics
covered or in the coverage of the topics discussed. No two state
labor relations laws are identical; and, if they were, there would
be a strong likelihood that in some respects the state boards or
the courts would offer different interpretations. The illustration
of how the NLRB changed positions several times on the "captive
audience" principle is an example of how an unchanged law can
mean different things at different times and under different cir-
cumstances-partly because it was being interpreted by different
people.
PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING UNFAm LABOR PRACTICE CoimLAINTs
"The procedural provisions of the labor relations statutes are
only slightly less controversial than are their substantive pro-
visions."2 33 In general, it may be said that these laws are ad-
ministered in one of two ways-by a quasi-judicial board with
the combined functions of investigation, prosecution, and ad-
judication; or, in some instances, enforcement through the exist-
ing system of courts. A typical example of the board method is
that employed by the federal government. But even under the
board method, decisions are subject to review by the courts.
Most states with labor relations acts have adopted the board
method of administration. It has been said, as a complaint against
this type of procedure, that the prosecution function and the
judicial function should be separated. In actual practice, this is
usually the case. Another basis of complaint against the board
type of administration is that some unfair practices are more
"unfair" than others and should be given priority. The LMRA
actually follows this practice; but, at the same time, it has been
the basis for other complaints-that only an unfair practice charge
against employees or a union can be given priority, and that these
233 Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 111. For a complete analysis of this subject, the
reader may refer to Chapter VII in Killingsworth.
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charges take precedence over all other unfair practice charges in-
cluding those against employers.
About 90 per cent of all cases that come before the New York
State Labor Relations Board, and this is probably typical of other
states that have a similar administrative set-up, are settled with-
out a formal hearing.234 Under the LMRA, during the fiscal year
ending June 80, 1954, 88.4 per cent of all unfair labor practice
cases were closed without a formal hearing before the NLRB.2 35
The objections to informal practices are that one party or the
other may be "forced" into accepting the other party's demands
in order to avoid litigation, and that informal investigation may
result in a prejudgment of the cases by the board.236 Elimination
of the informal hearings, as has been done in some states, would
seem to do little to alleviate the first situation; and the second has
been largely taken care of by allocating the various functions of
the board to different persons. This has been done at the federal
level by giving the General Counsel "the sole and independent
responsibility for investigating charges of unfair labor prac-
tices.2 37 Probably the greatest advantage of the board technique
is that both penalties and remedies are provided in a single action.
The court technique provides only penalties.3 8
In the processing of some unfair practice charges, the court
procedure would be less delaying; but, at the same time, it would
probably be difficult to standardize a great number of local courts
to the same extent as a state board operating under a single set
of administrative rules. Of the Minnesota act, which uses the
court technique of enforcement, it has been said:
The act does not provide adequate safeguards for employees
in the exercise of their rights to organize and bargain col-
lectively through their representatives. The practice of
handling unfair practice charges in the courts is not con-
ducive to remedying or preventing such practices by em-
ployers.
239
234 "Solutions by Agreement," 28 Industrial Bulletin, 27 (1949).
235 NLRB, Nineteenth Annual Report, op. cit., p. 6.
238 Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 135.
237 NLRB, Nineteenth Annual Report, op. cit., p. 5.
238 Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 134.
239 Stieber, op. cit., p. 31.
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CONTROL OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UNIONS
Much of the day-to-day discussion relative to collective bar-
gaining in all its phases has to do with the legislative enactment
of provisions for making unions more "responsible"-more respon-
sible to the members, to the employers, and to the public. One
method of encouraging-or forcing-unions to accept additional
responsibility is through the partial control by government of
their internal, affairs. The phrase "partial control" is used because
even those who advocate most vigorously that unions should be
brought under the watchful eye of the state would not argue
that they should become wards of the state. If controls are
necessary, they are necessary for one reason only-that certain
practices in which they are now free to engage are socially or
economically undesirable in this country. It is for this reason that
most controls are instituted, whether they are controls of the
internal affairs of general business, the private affairs of in-
dividuals, or the almost complete control of some aspects of
public utilities.
Regulations of the internal affairs of unions fall into four main
groups: the requirement of registration, licensing, incorporation,
and reports to the state; the regulation of union finances; the
regulation of the election of union officials; and the regulation
of membership policies. 40 Under the federal act, the NLRB can-
not take action to certify any union as a collective bargaining
agent or investigate and process an unfair labor practice com-
plaint against an employer unless the union involved has fulfilled
certain requirements relating to internal practices and policies. 4'
It was noted above, in connection with strike-vote provisions
of state laws, that a Colorado act requiring labor unions to in-
corporate was declared unconstitutional.4 2 Other provisions re-
lating to the internal affairs of unions fell at the same time, not
because of what they were, but because they were so entwined
in the incorporation provision that they could not stand alone.
A Texas statute 43 that made it illegal for a union organizer to
240 Killingsworth, op. cit., p. 98. For a summary of state laws regulating the
internal affairs of unions, see Chester A. Morgan. "State Regulations of Internal
Union Affairs," 6 Labor Law Journal, 226-233 (1955).
241 LMRA, secs. 9 (f) and (g).
242 American Federation of Labor v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90 (1944).
243 Vernon's Texas Statutes, art. 5154a, sec. 5.
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solicit members within the state without first registering with a
state official was declared unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in 1945;244 and in the same year, a Florida law
245
providing for the licensing of union business agents was held in-
valid by the Supreme Court because it was in conflict with the
NLRA.245 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals later held several
other sections of the union regulation law unconstitutional,247
including (a) the filing of annual financial statements with a state
official, (b) the provisions prescribing the method of electing
union officials, and (c) a section prohibiting the co'lection from
members in the form of dues, fees, assessments, and fines that
would create a fund "in excess of the reasonable requirements of
such union in carrying out its lawful purpose.... ." But the court,
at the same time passing on the validity of several other sections
of the same law, found no reason for throwing out a provision
prohibiting political contributions by unions, or one that re-
quired unions to file annually a report giving the names and
addresses of union officials, and other such information. The
Texas Court also held valid a provision requiring unions to keep
accurate and detailed financial records that may be inspected at
any time by the state attorney general or any member of the
union. The Florida union regulation law, in the Hill case, 48 was
invalidated as to the reporting and registration fee require-
ments, 249 not because of the illegality of the requirements as such,
but because they placed an obstacle in the path of collective
bargaining not consistent with federal policy.
The regulation of the membership policies of unions are, like-
wise, not confined to states with labor relations laws. One such
type of regulation, the "fair employment practice" type law, has
been enacted in several states and localities during the past few
years. These laws, designed to prevent discriminatory practices
in hiring, may apply also to unions in their discriminatory prac-
tices relating to new members. The Wisconsin Industrial Com-
mission, for example, recently requested that two Negro ap-
244 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
245 Laws of Florida, chap. 21968, see. 4.
240 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
247 American Federation of Labor v. Mann, 188 S.W. 2d 276 (Texas 1945).
248 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
249 Laws of Florida, chap. 21968, see. 6.
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plicants be admitted to membership in a union. The commission
can make only recommendations, but the courts have strengthened
somewhat this phase of the law.2 50 A Connecticut law25' that pro-
hibits the exclusion of persons from union membership because of
race was upheld by the Supreme Court of Errors of that state.252
In Pennsylvania the term "labor organization," as it is used
throughout the state's labor relations act, "shall not include any
labor organization which.., denies a person or persons member-
ship in its organization on a count of race, creed, color, or
political affiliation."25 3 Because of this provision, any employer
commits an unfair labor practice by negotiating a union security
agreement with a labor organization practicing discrimination.
Most of the controls over the internal affairs of unions are
designed to promote industrial peace, to encourage democratic
practices in union administration, and to prevent any organization
from gaining a position where it can control a particular labor
market or segment of such a market. There is a question in the
minds of many persons as to whether such controls have been
effective in advancing the desired ends, or whether such legisla-
tion has accomplished little more than the creation of additional
administrative work at the state and national levels. The Min-
nesota Labor Union Democracy Act254 was passed in 1943 to
regulate union election procedures and insure adequate financial
reporting to union members. No enforcement proceedings were
instituted under the act during the first five years it was in effect,
indicating either that the act was ineffective, provisionally or
administratively, or that all labor organizations in the state were
in compliance.255
Traditionally, in this country, regulation of the internal affairs
of unions has been left to the unions. But with the enormous in-
crease in union membership during the past 20 years and the
accompanying increase in social responsibility, many persons con-
sidered some control by government essential-in some instances
250 A finding by the Wisconsin Industrial Commission against Local 8, Brick-
layers, Masons and Plasterers International Union (A.F. of L.), cited at 35 LRRM
139.
251 General Statutes of Connecticut, chap. 371, sec. 7405.
252 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Commission on Civil
Rights, 140 Conn. 537 (1953).
25s3 Purdonds Pennsylvania Statutes, Title 43, sec. 211.3 (f).
254 Minnesota Statutes, chap. 179, sees. 18-24.
255 Stieber, op. cit., p. 29.
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with just cause. But most of the strict union regulation laws at
the state level were enacted prior to 1947, when internal controls
were made a part of federal policy. And many of these state laws
have been repealed, declared unconstitutional, or otherwise
rendered ineffective.
PUBLic INTEBEST DisPuTEs
A public interest dispute is here classified as one that, at the
outset, immediately and directly affects persons not directly in-
volved in the controversy. Such labor-management disputes, for
convenience, can be classified in three groups-those involving
public employees, those involving public utilities, and those in
private industry that do not fall in either of the above groups.
There is a provision in the federal act256 designed to control the
right of employees to strike and the right of employers to lockout
so as to prevent national emergencies. The LMRA also makes it
unlawful for any employee of the federal government to strike. 57
A strong case can be made for legal provisions that allow a state
to act immediately and with authority if a dispute involving the
public interest arises; but there is likewise a good case for pre-
serving the right to strike and lockout on the basis that they are
essential to collective bargaining. If the policy of a state, there-
fore, is to promote collective bargaining as a means of preserving
the rights of both employers and employees, and to decrease in-
dustrial strife, it is desirable to define "dispute affecting public
interest" narrowly enough (if, indeed, there is a special set of
rules that may be applied in such cases) to allow for the greatest
possible proportion of disputes to be settled through collective
bargaining. At the same time, it should also be recognized that
the safety and health of the people should not unduly be jeopard-
ized.
Public interest disputes in private industry
The Minnesota labor relations law258 provides that the Gover-
nor may appoint a fact-finding board to investigate public-in-
terest disputes when notified by the labor conciliator that "the
256 LMRA, sec. 202.
257 LMRA, see. 305.
258 Minnesota Statutes, chap. 179, see. 07.
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life, safety, health or well-being of a substantial number of people
in any community" is in jeopardy. Neither party to the dispute
may change the existing situation for a period of 30 days (longer
if the fact-finding boards deems it necessary). This act has been




and because the law has been abused by too broad an interpreta-
tion of public interest.2 60 In addition to the general provisions of
the Minnesota law, the state, in 1947, enacted a law26' prohibiting
strikes and lockouts in charitable hospitals. If a dispute does arise
that cannot be settled through collective bargaining or by resort
to the state conciliation service, the dispute must go to arbitration.
A Michigan statute262 providing for compulsory arbitration of
labor-management disputes in any hospital was declared uncon-
stitutional by the Michigan Supreme Court2 3 on the ground that
it conferred nonjudicial powers on a circuit judge. A Virginia
law264 provides for the seizure of coal mines by the Governor
whenever there is "an imminent threat of substantial interrup-
tion" that may endanger the health, welfare, or safety of the
people of Virginia; and a Massachusetts law,26 5 enacted in 1947,
states that "the distribution of food, fuel,... hospital and medical
services is essential to the public health and safety" and gives the
Governor a variety of means for dealing with disputes affecting
these industries. He may use seizure, fact-finding, or arbitration,
and by seizure can effectively prevent strikes or lockouts.
Public interest disputes in public utilities
In 1947 eight states266 passed laws to prevent the interruption
of public utility services by labor-management disputes. With the
declaration of the United States Supreme Court267 that the Wis-
consin law266 was invalid as applicable to industries in interstate
259 Stieber, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
260 Dale Yoder, "State Experiments in Labor Relations Legislation," 248 An-
nals of the American Academy of Political Science, 133 (1946).
261 Minnesota Statutes, chap. 179, sec. 38.
262 Compiled Laws of Michigan, chap. 423, sec. 13.
263 Local 170, Transport Workers Union of America, C.I.O. v. Gadola, 322
Mich. 332 (1948).264 Virginia Laws (1950), chap. 22.
265 Massachusetts Acts (1947), chap. 596.
266 Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin.
267 Amalgamated Association v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340
U.S. 394 (1951).
268 Wisconsin Statutes, chap. 111, subchap. 3.
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commerce, the laws in the other states that provided for com-
pulsory arbitration in such cases were rendered ineffective." 9 A
proposed amendment in the LMRA that would have made such
state laws valid was defeated in the United States Senate by a
vote of 50 to 42 in 1954.270
State regulation of emergency disputes is frequently based on
the confused idea that inconvenience and emergency are the
same. 1 This may lead to treating public utility disputes, even
labor-management troubles in other industries, as emergency dis-
putes when there is no immediate danger to the health or safety
of persons affected. Arbitration is usually considered a poor sub-
stitute for collective bargaining unless agreed to by the parties to
a dispute as a measure of last resort; and compulsory arbitration
as a means of settlement, coupled with the prohibition of strikes
and lockouts, lacks the endorsement of a majority of both the em-
ployers and the employees.
Disputes involving government employees
Just as the LMRA makes it unlawful for federal employees to
strike, several states '72 have passed laws that outlaw strikes by
employees of state and local governments. Under the present
state laws, as under the federal law, there are no exceptions. In
most instances the state acts are similar to the New York law
273
as to definitions and penalties, provisions for the automatic and
immediate discharge of any public employee going on strike, and
restrictions on the pay and tenure of any employee reinstated fol-
lowing his discharge under the law. The Texas law,2 74 which is as
comprehensive as, or more so than, any other state law restricting
the activities of government employees, provides that it is against
public policy for any government official to recognize a labor
organization as the bargaining agent for any group of employees.
219 "The Public Utilities Act of 1947 has not been used since 1950 because
a similar Wisconsin law was declared unconstitutional .... Also in 1950 . . .in a
local court the . . .law was declared invalid." Letter from a state chief con-
ciliator.
270 Congressional Record, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 100, Part 5 (May
7, 1954), 6202.
271 The Case Against "Right to Work" Laws (Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, no date), pp. 103-134.
272 Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Virginia. (35 LRRM 3030.)
273 New York, Civil Service Law, sec. 22-a.
274 Vernon's Texas Statute, art. 5154c.
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Any public employee in Texas who engages in a strike forfeits all
civil-service rights and any right to re-employment.
PART V
OPINIONs AND OBsEvATIoNs RELATING TO
LABOR RELATIONS LEGISLATION IN KENTUCKY
It is common, and frequently perhaps proper, to refer to pro-
posed changes in state labor relations policy as being endorsed
and supported by management or by labor. But it is unusual to
find representatives of either group in complete agreement on a
particular policy issue or on how such a policy should be effect-
uated. In the preceding chapter several proposed changes in
Kentucky law were analyzed in the light of experience under the
laws of other states and under the federal labor-management
relations act. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the pro-
posed changes as to which group within Kentucky-labor, man-
agement, both, or neither-supports such legislative changes, and
to what degree such changes are supported within these two
groups. The areas of general agreement between management
and labor are substantial; but the areas of disagreement are im-
portant and in the following analysis may be allocated a dis-
proportionate amount of space.
EmPLoEE REPsENTATioN AND ELECTONS
Both labor and management support vigorously the idea that
workers should be free to join unions of their own choosing. A
major employer organization in Kentucky has stated that an em-
ployer is morally bound to recognize and bargain collectively
with a union that represents a majority of his employees. But
while the unions would make such recognition compulsory, not
all employers would go along with a suggestion that some agency
of state government be given the right to hold representation
elections if requested to do so by either an employee or an organi-
zation of employees. Several persons familiar with labor relations
law through mediation or arbitration activity have suggested that
the Commissioner of Industrial Relations be given the authority
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to hold representation elections with or without the consent of
either labor or management.
There are two questions, however, that must be answered be-
fore any effective election machinery could be put into operation.
The first, having to do with appropriate bargaining unit, is an-
swered almost unanimously by both labor and management as
any unit agreed to by the parties. The second, having to do with
voter eligibility, is subject to considerable dispute. If thee is a
strike going on when an election is scheduled to be held, this
question becomes increasingly important. Assuming a state au-
thority has the right to order an election at the request of either
the employer or the employees, two possible courses are open.
Eligibility may be determined by administrative fiat as, for ex-
ample, in New York; or legal provisions may determine voter
eligibility as in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.
UNION SECUrTY
Several major employer organizations have gone on record as
favoring legislation that would outlaw union security agreements.
"Right-to-work" laws have just as vigorously been opposed by
organized labor. The major arguments, both pro and con, are
listed in the preceding chapter; but it should be pointed up that
neither the employers nor the representatives of organized labor
are in complete agreement with policy statements of their respec-
tive organizations. As a general rule, however, there is less dis-
agreement among union people as to the policy of the parent
organization than there is among employers. The union repre-
sentatives, almost without exception, favor retaining the present
standards relative to union shop agreements. (A union shop agree-
ment requires that all employees become members of the union
within a specified time after being employed.) A substantial
majority would also allow other forms of union security agree-
ments. Employers, although generally favoring "right-to-work"
legislation, look with more favor on the union shop than on other
types of union security. There appears to be some indication that
employers are more inclined to favor union security agreements
in the industries where unions have been long established. The
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remarks of two employers, paraphrased, are rather representative
of the different points of view.
Against union security agreements: No employee
should be forced to become a union member in order to
hold his job; he should be free to join or not join a union,
just as he is free to join or not join a church or other
organizations. The union shop is conducive to poor union
leadership, and membership on a voluntary basis is the
best guarantee of responsible union leadership. Forced
union membership has no place in a free society.
In favor of allowing union security agreements if
agreed to in collective bargaining: There is nothing wrong
with a union shop, as such, so long as it is the choice of a
majority of the employees and agreed to through collective
bargaining; and, as to industrial peace, which is one of the
most important goals of labor relations policy-either state
policy or that involving a single employer-there are many
things besides the enactment of a "right-to-work" law that
should be the basis of sound and peaceful collective bargain-
ing procedure.
UNFAm LABOR PRAcrIcEs
There is general agreement among both the employers and
labor that both parties should be required to bargain in good
faith-that it should be illegal for either party to refuse to bargain
collectively with the other where bargaining relationships have
been established previously or where the union represents a
majority of the employees in a particular bargaining unit. Both
groups likewise proclaim a distaste for coercion and interference
relative to the rights of any person, employer or employee; but a
few employers, as indicated by the publications of the National
Labor Relations Board and by other sources, would prefer to have
some of the "captive audience" techniques declared noncoercive.
Labor and management are in general agreement also that an
employee should not be discriminated against because of the em-
ployee's relationship with a labor organization.
Differences of opinion arise in connection with company
unions. Most union leaders, as would be expected, are opposed
to company unions; and under federal law it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to dominate or interfere with the formu-
KENTucKx LABOR LEGISLATION
lation or administration of a labor union. But even under federal
law, the employees of a particular plant or firm (subject to bar-
gaining unit qualifications) can organize themselves into a bona
fide labor union and bargain collectively with their employer.
The restrictions of government and the actions of organized
labor designed to curb entirely or reduce the number of juris-
dictional disputes were mentioned earlier. Such a dispute occurs
when the members of two different unions both lay claim to a
particular job or operation. Both unions, or the members of both
unions, are competing for jurisdiction over a particular segment of
the total market for labor. Employers generally are in favor of
declaring jurisdictional disputes illegal. But even though such
disputes are recognized by labor organizations as one of the weak
spots in the argument for strong labor unions, there are few per-
sons in the labor movement who would suggest outlawing juris-
dictional strikes. Organized labor views jurisdictional problems
as an internal matter-as something that should be settled by the
unions and not by law. An example of such action on a local scale
is exemplified by the Louisville Jurisdictional Peace Plan.
Although strikes and boycotts have traditionally been recog-
nized as the most potent weapons of organized labor, secondary
boycotts have seldom, if ever, been accepted by the courts or by
the public as being justifiable to the same degree as have strikes.
As in the case of jurisdictional disputes, there is the argument of
injury to a third person-a person with whom no dispute exists but
against whom pressure is directed as a means of persuading such
third person to perform some act or suffer economic harm. And,
as in the case of jurisdictional disputes, employers are almost
unanimously in favor of declaring secondary boycotts illegal;
union representatives are generally of the opposite view.
CONTROL OF TEE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF UNIONS
Even though most employers and a majority of union officials
would, in any proposed labor relations law, give the state con-
siderable control over the internal affairs of unions, considerable
opposition to such control has been expressed by many persons
actively engaged in mediation and arbitration work. Whether
such control over the financial affairs, membership policies, and
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internal policy in general should come under the watchful eye
of the state may be open to dispute. The questions that follow are
intended merely as a guide to individuals in their quest for a satis-
factory answer relative to proper state policy. Do the regulations
in the federal law provide for more or less than adequate control?
Would state controls improve collective bargaining? Would the
benefits derived from state controls be commensurate with the
cost of administration?
PUBLIC INTEREST DISPUTEs
Management and labor both support the idea that the state
should enact special legislation applicable in the case of any dis-
pute involving a privately owned public utility or hospital. Legis-
lation of this type usually consists of waiting periods before strikes,
the compulsory participation of government mediators, the use of
injunctions, and other techniques designed to delay strike action
until every possible means of averting a strike has been tried. The
United States Supreme Court, it will be recalled, has declared
unconstitutional a state law that provided for compulsory arbitra-
tion in public utility disputes. There is also a general consensus
that government employees not directly associated with protec-
tion of the health or welfare of the people should not be deprived
of the right to strike.
ADMINISTRATION
The effectiveness of any policy a state may adopt regarding
the rights and duties of labor and management and the role of
government in labor relations, and the effectiveness of the legisla-
tion, if any, enacted to implement such a policy, must hinge in
part upon administrative procedures. There is general agreement
between labor and management that a state labor relations law,
if enacted, should parallel somewhat the federal law and many
state laws as to the administrative set-up. A comment that is
made frequently by persons from the ranks of both management
and labor is that the governing board should consist of representa-
tives of both groups and of the general public. The public in-
terest, as persons in both groups specifically stated or implied,
should be the paramount consideration.
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MEDIATION AND CONCIATION
If a strike or lockout can be averted or shortened by bringing
in a neutral third party to assist in resolving the basic issues of a
dispute, the net result is usually beneficial to both parties. There
is no basic disagreement between management and labor as to
whether the state should provide for mediation and conciliation
in labor disputes at the request of the parties. Kentucky, at the
present time, has a law that allows the Commissioner of Industrial
Relations or others he may appoint to mediate labor disputes at
the request of the parties. Various suggestions have been made
on how this service may be made more effective. The federal
government has established an independent agency wholly apart
from the National Labor Relations Board to mediate labor-man-
agement disputes. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Serv-
ice has been effective because (a) there has been a general ac-
ceptance of the principle of collective bargaining, without which
third-party intervention can accomplish little; (b) the public was
ready to accept national labor relations policy when it was writ-
ten into the law; and (c) recognition of the fact that mediators
must be persons of integrity-experienced, respected, and well-
trained. -7 5
OTHER OPINIONS AND OBSEIRVATIONS
Many interested individuals have expressed opinions as to the
proper role of the state government in relation to collective bar-
gaining generally, and to particular provisions specifically. As a
means of summarizing these remarks, they are paraphrased below.
Management comments
1. All administrative agencies should be representative of the
public interests, not loaded in favor of either management or
labor.
2. Legal provisions relative to liability and damages are par-
ticularly important. Damage suits against individuals, unions,
and corporations should be allowed.
275 Carl R. Schedler, "'ird Party Assistance in Labor-Management Relations,"
Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Louisiana Personnel Management Conference
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University College of Commerce, 1955), pp. 46-51.
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3. The purpose of any such law should be to provide equal
protection and rights to both management and labor consistent
with the fairest possible settlement of labor-management disputes.
Neither party should be favored by the law-the public should be
favored.
4. Any strike not authorized by a majority of the members
voting should be illegal; and, in the event of a strike, the em-
ployees should have the right to vote on whether to accept the
employers last offer.
5. There should be a "right-to-work" law, providing a person
with the right to work without union a/ffliation.
6. Any law relating to labor-management relations should be
designed to encourage new industry to come to the state.
7. Jurisdictional disputes should be outlawed.
Labor comments
1. Administration of a state labor relations law should be in
the public interest, and there should be appropriations enough to
administer the law effectively.
2. There should be no restrictions on the right to negotiate a
union security agreement through the collective bargaining proc-
ess.
3. The finding of either labor or management guilty of an
unfair practice should result in a heavy fine on the guilty party.
4. Most important, a state labor relations law should provide
for representation elections in firms in intrastate commerce and
for collective bargaining in good faith.
5. A state labor relations law should be patterned after the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
6. A state labor relations law would not be in the best interest
of labor; any legislation, based on the history of state labor legis-
lation since 1947, would be undesirable.
Comments in general
Kentucky labor relations law has evolved from the application
of common law principles by the courts and a minimum of statu-
tory law. From time to time persons from the ranks of both man-
agement and labor have complained of the lack of legislation;
but the thought that Kentucky statutory law is inadequate is not
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universal among either group. Complaints as to the deficiencies
are usually directed toward something specific-jurisdictional dis-
putes, representation elections, union security, etc.-and only in-
frequently represent a broad view of the role of a state in relation
to labor relations.
Two important facts have frequently been pointed up as con-
stituting a basis for re-evaluating the legal foundations and scope
of labor law in Kentucky. The state is becoming industrialized;
and, as industrial employment increases, it is argued, the need
for a legislated set of working rules in labor-management relations
increases. Also, the scope of federal jurisdiction over labor-man-
agement relations has been narrowed leaving a greater area to
state regulation. These two factors, in some quarters, are reasons
enough for advocating a state labor relations law. But the con-
temporary situation, according to other sources, does not merit
a change from the course presently being followed. Advocates of
both policies include persons from both management and labor
groups.
Little has been said of the attitudes and ideas, relating to the
proper scope of a labor relations law for Kentucky, of persons
other than those that may be classified as either promanagement
or prolabor. Persons who participate regularly in labor relations
activity but who represent neither party-mediators, conciliators,
and arbitrators-have made suggestions from time to time relating
to state labor relations law. In general, such persons have prefer-
ence for a law that is administratively simple-a law that, in ad-
dition to the present provisions, would provide for the holding of
representation elections at the request of either an employer or his
employees, a minimum number of provisions to insure the full
operation of the collective bargaining process in the event the
employees selected a union as their bargaining agent, and little
else. Such a law would leave the control of the internal affairs of
unions, for example, to be administered as part of the national
policy; and as to the other areas subject to state control, such as
secondary boycott and damage suits, the present policy would
supposedly continue as at present, subject to judicial interpreta-
tion.
It is the responsibility of government to assure that neither
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management nor a union, with respect to labor relations, have
unrestricted power in the conduct of its affairs. It is, therefore,
the responsibility of government to define the rights and duties
of both labor and management, and to specify how these rights
should be protected and how these duties should be imposed.
This is the substance of labor relations law.
